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FOR-PROFIT PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
 
Margaret H. Lemos∗ and Max Minzner∗∗ 
This Article investigates an important yet undertheorized phenomenon: financial 
incentives in public enforcement.  Each year, public enforcers assess billions of dollars in 
penalties and other financial sanctions for violations of state and federal law.  Why?  If 
the awards in question were the result of private lawsuits, the answer would be obvious.  
We expect that private enforcers — the victims of law violations and their fee-seeking 
attorneys — will attempt to maximize financial recoveries.  Record recoveries come as 
no surprise in private class actions, for example.  But dollar signs are harder to explain 
in the context of public enforcement.  Unlike private attorneys who are paid a percentage 
of the recovery, public enforcers are paid by salary.  They have no direct financial stake 
in successful enforcement efforts.  We assume that public enforcers pursue financial 
awards only for their deterrent value, not for the benefits that such recoveries can bring 
the enforcement agency itself. 
Or do they?  Contrary to the conventional wisdom on the division between public and 
private enforcement, this Article argues that public enforcers often seek large monetary 
awards for self-interested reasons divorced from the public interest in deterrence.  The 
incentives are strongest when enforcement agencies are permitted to retain all or some of 
the proceeds of enforcement — an institutional arrangement that is common at the state 
level and beginning to crop up in federal law.  Yet even when public enforcers must turn 
over their winnings to the general treasury, they may have reputational incentives to 
focus their efforts on measurable units like dollars earned.  Financially motivated public 
enforcers are likely to behave more like private enforcers than is commonly appreciated: 
they will undertake more enforcement actions, focus on maximizing financial recoveries 
rather than securing injunctive relief, and compete with other would-be enforcers for 
lucrative cases.  Those effects will often be undesirable, particularly in circumstances 
where the risk of overenforcement is high.  But financial incentives might provide a 
valuable spur to action for agencies that currently are performing well below optimal 
levels.  Policymakers recognize as much when they seek to boost private enforcement by 
promising prevailing plaintiffs supracompensatory damages.  We show that financial 
incentives can serve a similar purpose in the public sphere, offering policymakers an 
additional tool for calibrating the level of public enforcement. 
INTRODUCTION 
aw enforcement is a big business.  Public enforcers at both the 
state and federal levels bring in billions of dollars each year as the 
result of settlements and court judgments.  In Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, 
for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reported 
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total recoveries of $2.8 billion;1 in FY 2012, the Departments of Justice 
(DOJ) and Health and Human Services (HHS) together recovered $3 
billion in health care fraud actions;2 the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) imposed more than $900 million in financial 
sanctions;3 and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) imposed 
civil and criminal penalties totaling $252 million.4  State attorneys 
general banded together to negotiate a $25 billion settlement with the 
nation’s leading mortgage-servicing banks.5  Individual attorneys gen-
eral have also boasted of millions of dollars in additional recoveries for 
their states and citizens.6 
What motivates public enforcers to pursue large financial recover-
ies?  If the recoveries in question were the result of private lawsuits, 
the answer would be obvious.  We expect private enforcers to maxi-
mize monetary recoveries, in order to return as much money as possi-
ble to victims and — perhaps especially — to enlarge the fee for  
private counsel.  Because we assume that private enforcement is fi-
nancially motivated, dollar signs do not surprise us.  We would be 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 1 
(2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy13congbudgjust.pdf. 
 2 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Acting Associate Attorney General Tony West Speaks at Pen 
and Pad Briefing Announcing Record Civil FY 2012 Recoveries (Dec. 4, 2012), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/asg/speeches/2012/asg-speech-1212041.html (describing a collaboration 
between the DOJ and HHS called “the Health Care Fraud and Enforcement Action Team, or 
‘HEAT,’” which “led to [the recovery of] $3 billion in health care fraud actions under the False 
Claims Act in FY 2012 — a record for a single year”). 
 3 COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT: FIS-
CAL YEAR 2012, at 49 (2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc 
/documents/file/2012apr.pdf. 
 4 Enforcement Annual Results for Fiscal Year 2012, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http:// 
www2.epa.gov/enforcement/enforcement-annual-results-fiscal-year-2012 (last visited Nov. 24, 
2013).  
 5 PHILIP A. LEHMAN, N.C. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT: EX-
ECUTIVE SUMMARY OF MULTISTATE/FEDERAL SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCON-
DUCT CLAIMS 1, available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=natlsetexecsum 
%282%29.pdf. 
 6 See, e.g., MIKE DEWINE, OHIO ATT’Y GEN., ANNUAL REPORT 26 (2012), available at  
h t t p : / / w w w . o h i o a t t o r n e y g e n e r a l . g o v / O h i o A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l / f i l e s / d 1 / d 1 e c 9 9 e 5 - 5 f 0 a - 4 4 2 d - 8 5 f 0 
-248d01026439.pdf (reporting recoveries of $14.5 million in settlements involving off-label market-
ing of pharmaceutical drugs); Letter from Lisa Madigan, Ill. Att’y Gen., to Tim Mapes, Clerk of 
the Ill. House of Representatives (Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov 
/publications/annualrpt_ga/revenue/REPORT_TO_ILLINOIS_HOUSE_2012.pdf (reporting total 
collections of $570,925,134.84 by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office in calendar year 2012); see 
also MARTHA COAKLEY, MASS. ATT’Y GEN., REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 7 (2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/ourorganization/fy11 
-annual-report.pdf (“In Fiscal Year 2011, our Office was able to secure more than $400 million in 
recoveries and savings based on a budget of $37 million.  That is a return on investment by the 
Commonwealth of approximately 10 to one.”); JOHN R. KROGER, OR. ATT’Y GEN., ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2012), available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/about/pdf/annual 
_report_2011.pdf (reporting recoveries of $2,715,000 in antitrust and securities cases, and 
$8,493,508 in health care fraud cases in 2011). 
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troubled by astronomical judgments if we thought that they represent 
random blows, like lightning strikes,7 or that they create a windfall 
culture and discourage socially beneficial behavior.8  Or we would ap-
plaud them if we believed that they compensate victims for harm and 
deter further wrongdoing.  Either way, we have both a theory by 
which to understand financial recoveries in private cases and a vocab-
ulary for making normative assessments. 
We lack similar tools for assessing financial incentives in public en-
forcement because we assume that such incentives do not exist.  In-
deed, financial incentives (or the lack thereof) mark one of the conven-
tional dividing lines between private and public enforcement.9  Private 
enforcers — typically victims and their fee-seeking counsel — are out 
for money; public enforcers — typically salaried government attor- 
neys — are not.  Public enforcers pursue financial penalties, to be sure, 
but we assume that they value money only as an instrument of public 
policy.  On this view, monetary penalties are simply another tool in the 
government’s enforcement toolkit, along with imprisonment, injunc-
tive relief, and other forms of compensatory and punitive relief.  Thus, 
under this line of reasoning we should take for granted that agencies 
seek monetary recoveries to deter wrongdoers and strip away their 
gains, not to reap the benefits that such recoveries can bring the en-
forcement agencies themselves. 
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom on financial incen-
tives in public enforcement.  We show that both federal and state 
agencies have self-interested reasons to maximize financial recoveries, 
even though their employees are paid by salary and do not profit fi-
nancially from successful enforcement.  The most obvious incentive 
comes from institutional arrangements that allow enforcement agencies 
to retain a portion of any financial awards they win.10  Such arrange-
ments are common at the state level and are beginning to crop up in 
federal law as well.  Yet they have received virtually no attention  
in the literature on public enforcement, even as they complicate fa- 
miliar assumptions about the division between public and private  
enforcement. 
Even in cases when public enforcers must turn over any monetary 
recoveries to the general treasury, we suggest that agencies may have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 See Robert J. Rhee, A Financial Economic Theory of Punitive Damages, 111 MICH. L. REV. 
33, 35 (2012) (likening punitive damages awards to lightning strikes); Stephen D. Sugarman, Do-
ing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 567 (1985) (same). 
 8 See John H. Beisner et al., Class Action “Cops”: Public Servants or Private Entrepreneurs?, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1441, 1444–51 (2005) (summarizing critiques of expanding private class actions). 
 9 See infra Part I, pp. 858–63. 
 10 See infra section II.A.1, pp. 864–75. 
  
2014] FOR-PROFIT PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 857 
reputational interests in maximizing financial awards.11  Money has 
two significant advantages over other forms of relief: it is easy to un-
derstand and easy to quantify and compare.  An agency can easily 
trumpet a “record” financial judgment.12  It is far more difficult for 
public enforcers to convey the importance or the scale of injunctive 
remedies.  The difficulty is compounded when the public policy payoff 
of nonmonetary relief is uncertain and will be realized, if at all, in fu-
ture years.  Particularly when agencies face public scrutiny and in-
creased oversight from Congress, they may have strong incentives to 
focus their efforts on performance measures — such as dollars collect-
ed — that send a clear signal and permit comparisons over time and 
across agencies. 
If public enforcers have both direct and reputational incentives to 
seek large financial recoveries, does it matter?  We argue that financial 
incentives are likely to affect public enforcement in several ways.13  
Financially motivated agencies are apt to initiate more enforcement 
actions, reduce their focus on nonmonetary remedies, and compete 
with one another for enforcement dollars.  Notably, each of these ef-
fects brings public enforcement closer to the private model — and 
highlights dangers that are widely recognized in that context.  For ex-
ample, critics of private enforcement have long argued that avaricious 
plaintiffs and attorneys may be tempted to overenforce and may em-
phasize financial recoveries in lieu of more meaningful injunctive re-
lief.  We show that the same risks exist on the public side of the line. 
But to say that for-profit public enforcement is risky is not neces-
sarily to condemn it in all contexts.  As students of private enforce-
ment know so well, financial incentives can provide a much-needed 
spur to action in circumstances where enforcement levels are inappro-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 See infra section II.A.2, pp. 875–86. 
 12 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC 
Charges it Misrepresented Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser (Aug. 
9, 2012), available at http://ftc.gov/opa/2012/08/google.shtm (describing a $22.5 million dollar pen-
alty imposed on Google by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the largest fine in the FTC’s 
history for violation of a Commission order); Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, OCC Assesses $500 Million Civil Money Penalty Against HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (Dec. 11, 
2012), available at http://occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-173.html (report-
ing record-setting $500 million sanction levied against HSBC Bank by the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency); Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders 
Barclays to Pay $200 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting Con-
cerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates (June 27, 2012), available  
at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12 (reporting $200 million civil penalty 
imposed by the CFTC on Barclays Bank); Scotts Miracle-Gro Company Settlement, U.S.  
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil/fifra 
/scottsmiraclegro.html (reporting $6,050,000 civil penalty assessed by the EPA against Scotts  
Miracle-Gro, the largest civil penalty ever assessed under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act).    
 13 See infra section III.A, pp. 895–903. 
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priately low.  Congress recognizes as much when it encourages private 
enforcement by offering supracompensatory damages to successful 
plaintiffs.  Similar tools could be used to jump-start stalled public en-
forcement.14  They have been ignored to date, however, on the as-
sumption that financially motivated public enforcement is a misnomer. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I reviews the conven-
tional wisdom on public and private enforcement.  Part II explains 
why it would be a mistake to assume that salaried government attor-
neys have no self-interest in maximizing financial recoveries.  Part III 
describes the effects of financial incentives on public enforcement and 
assesses the costs and benefits.  A brief conclusion follows. 
I.  FINANCIAL INCENTIVES IN PUBLIC  
AND PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
In 1974, Professors Gary Becker and George Stigler published a 
provocative article advocating the privatization of law enforcement.15  
Central to Becker and Stigler’s thesis is the fact that public and pri-
vate enforcers are compensated in different ways.  Public enforcers are 
paid a flat salary, whereas private enforcers profit directly from en-
forcement.  Because the public enforcer’s expected gain from enforce-
ment is much lower than the violator’s expected loss, Becker and 
Stigler argued that the public enforcer is susceptible to bribes.  The vi-
olator can offer to pay the enforcer some sum below the expected pen-
alty in exchange for dropping the enforcement.16  The deal would ben-
efit both parties.  The public enforcer would turn a profit, and the 
violator would avoid paying for the full extent of the harm he caused 
and thus would not be deterred from further misconduct.  Such bribes 
are not possible in a system of private enforcement, however, where 
enforcers (victims or their agents) typically stand to gain the same 
amount as the perpetrator stands to lose.17 
In the years since Becker and Stigler’s article was published, a rich 
theoretical literature on the differences between public and private en-
forcement has developed.  Building on Becker and Stigler’s claim that 
public enforcement may be subject to corruption, commentators have 
exposed various other ways that public enforcement may skew away 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 14 See infra section III.B, pp. 903–12. 
 15 See Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation 
of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1974). 
 16 See id. at 5. 
 17 Id. at 14 (“The amount of victim enforcement would be optimal if successful enforcers were 
paid the amount that they had suffered in damages, excluding their enforcement costs, divided by 
the probability that they are successful . . . .  If this amount were levied in fines against convicted 
violators, so that, in effect, violators compensated victims, the gain to victims from enforcement 
would be the same as the punishment to violators; hence these enforcers could not be corrupted.”). 
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from the public interest.  Politicians may undermine enforcement ef-
forts by replacing key personnel or cutting budgets,18 and limited re-
sources may prevent public enforcers from uncovering and pursuing 
violations.19  Public enforcement agencies may be captured by the very 
firms they should be targeting.20  Individual government attorneys 
may pull their punches in enforcement because they hope to secure a 
job in the regulated industry21 or may avoid difficult cases in favor of 
those that are easy to win.22  Alternatively, public enforcement may 
sometimes be overzealous, particularly when politicians react to well-
publicized scandals.23 
Notice what is missing from this picture: financial incentives.  
Commentators continue to work from the premise that public enforc-
ers, because they are paid by salary, have no direct financial stake in 
the success of litigation.  The financial disinterest of public enforcers 
has no obvious normative valence.  Depending on the circumstances 
and one’s view of optimal enforcement, the absence of a profit motive 
may be a good thing (allowing public enforcers to withstand the  
temptation to go after every colorable violation)24 or a bad thing (de- 
priving enforcers of a much-needed incentive to pursue vigorous  
enforcement).25  But it is a constant in the positive account of public  
enforcement. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 See Kenneth W. Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence, and Conflict of 
Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 67 (1975) (“[W]hen the budget is determined by the political pro-
cess, there is no reason to believe that the rate of enforcement would be economically optimal.”); 
see also Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relation-
ship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1341 
(2008) (arguing that the SEC “is subject to political whims (particularly with respect to its  
budget)”). 
 19 See Richard B. Stewart & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. 
L. REV. 1193, 1214 (1982) (“Public enforcement is . . . frequently inadequate because of budget 
constraints . . . .”). 
 20 On the capture concept generally, see STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC 
INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY GOVERNMENT 14–25 (2008); and 
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014). 
 21 See infra note 163 and accompanying text (describing and critiquing the “revolving door” 
theory of government attorney behavior). 
 22 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 637–38 (6th ed. 2003) (explain-
ing that agencies will prefer to pursue cases that are “relatively unimportant to the defendant,” id. 
at 637, and therefore cheaper and easier to win); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of 
Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1998) (arguing 
that public enforcers opt “to concentrate [their] efforts on small, routine [civil rights] cases”).  
 23 See A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retirement?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 
1076 (2005) (identifying a “cyclical pattern of neglect and hysterical overreaction” in the actions of 
Congress and the SEC). 
 24 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 39 (1975) (discussing importance of “discretionary nonenforcement”). 
 25 See Selmi, supra note 22, at 1443 (arguing that federal civil rights agencies are weak enforc-
ers in part because they have no financial stake in the outcomes of their cases).  
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The conventional wisdom on private enforcement could not  
be more different.  Personal financial incentives lie at the heart of  
well-known critiques of private enforcement, beginning with Professor  
William Landes and then-Professor Richard Posner’s response to 
Becker and Stigler.  Landes and Posner argue that private enforcement 
will lead to overenforcement whenever the available penalty exceeds 
the harm — for example, where multiple or punitive damages are 
available.26  Policymakers might adopt high penalties as a way to 
economize on the resources devoted to enforcement; by raising the 
penalty and lowering the level of enforcement (and thus the probabil-
ity that any violator will be sanctioned), policymakers can obtain the 
same level of deterrence at lower cost.  But a higher penalty will in-
duce financially motivated private enforcers to devote more resources 
to enforcement, potentially resulting in overenforcement.27 
That critique is generalized in Professor Steven Shavell’s seminal 
article, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the So-
cial Motive to Use the Legal System.28  As his title suggests, Shavell fo-
cuses on the divergence between private litigants’ decisions to bring 
suit — which typically are fueled by a desire for compensation or other 
relief — and the social interest in deterring unwanted behavior.  There 
is no necessary connection between the compensatory and the deter-
rent value of enforcement.  Thus, Shavell convincingly shows, an en-
forcement scheme driven by the self-interested decisions of private 
parties can result in either over- or underdeterrence.29 
Other commentators have applied the insights from the theoretical 
literature to particular areas of law, arguing that financially motivated 
private litigation is producing too little or too much enforcement.  
Complaints about profit-maximizing private enforcement are common 
in debates over class actions, for example.  Critics contend that greedy 
class counsel are lining their pockets at the expense of blameless de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 26 Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 15. 
 27 Id. (emphasizing that the same problem does not arise in public enforcement because “pub-
lic enforcer[s are] not constrained to act as . . . private profit maximizer[s]”).  For an argument 
outlining the ways in which procedural and evidentiary structures may prevent overenforcement, 
see Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743 (2005).  
 28 Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to 
Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997). 
 29 Id. at 578 (“[I]t could be that the plaintiff’s benefit from suit exceeds the social deterrent 
benefit (suppose that damages are high but that deterrence is slight because there is little injurers 
can do to reduce harm).  Or it could be that the plaintiff’s return from suit is less than its deter-
rent effect (suppose that damages would be small but that deterrence would be significant because 
injurers can exercise cheap and effective precautions).”); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private 
Versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980) (arguing that in many cases 
financially motivated private enforcement will result in underdeterrence, particularly where the 
external damage from the violation is large and enforcement costs are high). 
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fendants and clueless class members,30 while supporters insist that our 
best hope of deterring widespread corporate wrongdoing is to harness 
the financial incentives of entrepreneurial private attorneys.31  Both 
sides of the debate seek to make sense of the relationship between pub-
lic and private enforcement.  Some argue that private enforcement 
should take a back seat to public enforcement, on the ground that the 
latter can avoid the financial distortions that define the former.32  Oth-
ers argue that private enforcement is a critical supplement to public 
enforcement, precisely because public enforcers lack a strong personal 
interest in maximizing penalties — and thus, deterrence.33  Again, the 
collective assumption is that, when it comes to money, the incentives of 
public and private enforcers are starkly different.  Public enforcers are 
motivated by politics, not profits; they “care” about financial recoveries 
only to the extent that monetary awards translate into justice.34 
The widespread assumption that public and private enforcers can 
be distinguished by their interest (or disinterest) in monetary rewards 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 
IND. L.J. 625, 633 (1987) (“The existence of high agency costs implies the likelihood of ‘opportun-
istic behavior.’ . . . At its simplest, the classic form of opportunism in class actions is the ‘sweet-
heart’ settlement, namely one in which the plaintiff’s attorney trades a high fee award for a low 
recovery.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Eco-
nomic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 669, 686–90 (1986) (using economic analysis to demonstrate why class counsel’s focus on 
fees may lead to premature settlements when counsel will receive a percentage of the total recov-
ery); William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is — And Why It Matters, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2162–63 (2004) (noting the “virtual mantra of the class action literature,” id. 
at 2162, that “class actions are characterized by a rent-seeking entrepreneur pursuing her own 
interests with little oversight by her principals,” id. at 2162–63).  An opposing (but equally critical) 
line of scholarship emphasizes concerns that class actions will compel blameless defendants to 
settle frivolous suits in order to avoid the costs of litigation or the risk of crushing liability.  See 
Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits — The 
Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (coining the term “legal-
ized blackmail” to describe class settlements induced by “the threat of unmanageable and expen-
sive litigation”).  See generally Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and 
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357 (2003) (describing and critiquing claims of excessive settlement 
pressure in class actions). 
 31 See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs 
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103 (2006). 
 32 See Rose, supra note 18, at 1301 (arguing that public enforcers should screen putative secu-
rities class actions because private “‘bounty hunter’ enforcement of an overbroad law, like Rule 
10b-5, may lead to overdeterrence and stymie governmental efforts to set effective enforcement 
policy”). 
 33 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Law-
yer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REV. 215, 220 (1983) (“In theory, the private  
attorney general is induced by the profit motive to seek out cases that otherwise might go  
undetected.”). 
 34 See Rubenstein, supra note 30, at 2139 (“[P]ublic attorneys work for the public and are paid 
a salary to do so.  The amount of time they invest in an issue, the amount of sanction they recov-
er, or the amount of harm they deter, has no bearing on their fee.  Their priorities, the uses of their 
billable hours, are generally determined by politics, not money.”). 
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is particularly striking in light of the fact that, not too long ago, public 
enforcers often were compensated in ways that were tied directly to 
their enforcement efforts.  Tax collectors retained some of the taxes 
they collected, customs agents profited directly from the duties they 
collected, and prosecutors were paid per conviction.35  Most U.S. ju-
risdictions abandoned such payment schemes by the turn of the twen-
tieth century, due in large part to concerns that bounty-based public 
enforcement would result in the same kind of overzealousness — a 
failure to exercise appropriate prosecutorial discretion — that we have 
come to expect from private enforcement.36  This historical episode, 
while largely forgotten,37 served to cement the tradition of fixed sala-
ries for public employees, “mak[ing] the absence of the profit motive a 
defining feature of government.”38 
In the pages that follow, we show that this supposed distinction be-
tween public and private enforcement is not as sharp as it first ap-
pears.  Indeed, the line between the two categories of enforcement  
already has begun to blur in the face of a growing recognition  
that public enforcement often serves a function traditionally asso- 
ciated with private litigation: compensating victims.39  Complicating  
matters further, public and private enforcers increasingly work to- 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discre-
tion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 880–81, 880 n.114 (1995) 
(“State prosecutors commonly collected conviction fees payable according to statutory schedules.”  
Id. at 880–81.).  See generally NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE 
SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 125–254 (2013). 
 36 See PARRILLO, supra note 35, at 125–254 (describing transition from bounties to salaries).  
As Parrillo explains, “officers’ profit motive discouraged them from making the kind of subjective 
and discretionary decisions not to enforce the law that were (and are) necessary to sand off the 
hard edges of modern state power so it can win acceptance by the population.”  Id. at 4.  Parrillo 
also details a different kind of problem with for-profit public enforcement:  
The effective implementation of legislative will depended (and still depends) on a large 
degree of mass voluntary cooperation by the affected individuals, and bounties turned 
out to undermine such cooperation.  The officer’s monetary incentive to impose sanc-
tions on laypersons placed him in such an adversarial position toward them as to vitiate 
their trust in government and elicit from them a mirror-image adversarial response.   
Id. 
 37 See id. at 4 (“That American government made a transition from profit-seeking toward sal-
aries is a story largely untold and unknown.”). 
 38 Id. at 1. 
 39 For a discussion of victim compensation by one particular federal agency, see Verity 
Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1103, 
1110–23 (2008) (describing efforts by the SEC to distribute financial recoveries to injured individ-
uals).  The federal government’s move toward victim compensation is not limited to the SEC.  
See Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 533–39 (2011) (describing 
equivalent powers vested in the FTC and the Food and Drug Administration).  For a discussion 
of victim compensation by state attorneys general, see Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation 
Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 492–511 
(2012) (discussing representative suits by state attorneys general that serve roles similar to damag-
es class actions). 
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gether, as where public and private attorneys join forces to pursue a  
common foe,40 or where public enforcement agencies rely on private  
contingency-fee lawyers to litigate their cases.41  There is reason to 
suspect that public enforcement changes in subtle ways when public 
enforcers are asked to pursue one of the core goals of private enforce-
ment or to work closely with others who are focused on maximizing 
financial recoveries.  The argument here is different: regardless of 
whether monetary recoveries will be used to compensate victims or  
deter future wrongdoing (or both), public enforcers have self-interested 
reasons to maximize financial awards. 
II.  FOR-PROFIT PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 
The conventional wisdom holds that public enforcers lack direct 
incentives to maximize financial recoveries because — unlike private 
litigants and lawyers — government attorneys and agency personnel 
are paid by salary and cannot turn lucrative litigation into personal 
profit.  As this Part demonstrates, the conventional view is missing an 
important part of the picture.  It is true that public enforcers do not 
profit from successful litigation in the sense of taking home a percent-
age of awards, as private lawyers might.  Nevertheless, the institution-
al structures in which many public enforcers work provide ample in-
centives for salaried government employees to prioritize and maximize 
financial recoveries.  First, in many cases, the institutions of public en-
forcement are permitted to retain all or part of the proceeds of en-
forcement.  Second, even where the relevant agency or office must turn 
over any awards to the general treasury, public enforcers seeking  
reputational rewards have good reason to focus on easily quantifiable,  
revenue-producing financial recoveries. 
For ease of exposition, this Part begins by discussing those incen-
tives at the institutional level — that is, at the level of an enforcement 
agency or office — treating an agency as a unitary actor.  We later ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 See Lemos, supra note 39, at 499 & n.54 (discussing joint enforcement actions by state at-
torneys general and private class counsel).  In many regulatory settings, moreover, public and pri-
vate enforcers operate side by side, armed with parallel authority to go after the same offenders 
separately — and sometimes together.  As Professor David Engstrom observes: “[A]lthough much 
of the existing theoretical literature treats public and private enforcement as pure substitutes and 
a binary choice . . . [,] ‘many of our most consequential regulatory regimes have evolved . . . into 
hybrids of public and private enforcement in which multiple enforcers . . . operate and interact 
within complex ecologies of enforcement.’”  David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of  
Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation Under the  
False Claims Act, 107 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 61) (quoting David  
Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2013)  
(manuscript at 5)). 
 41 See Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 735–36 
(2011).   
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pand the discussion to address the reality that any public enforcement 
agency is a “they,” not an “it.”42  In the latter half of this Part, we ex-
amine the reasons why agency personnel, from political appointees at 
the top to careerists and short-term employees at the “street level,” 
might themselves have incentives to maximize financial recoveries. 
A.  Institutional Incentives 
1.  Revolving Funds. — The default rule under both state and fed-
eral law is that the proceeds of public enforcement belong to the public 
fisc rather than to the agency or official responsible for the action.  
That rule is codified in the federal Miscellaneous Receipts Act43 
(MRA), which states (subject to certain enumerated exceptions) that 
“an official or agent of the Government receiving money for the Gov-
ernment from any source shall deposit the money in the Treasury as 
soon as practicable without deduction for any charge or claim.”44  Vir-
tually every state has a comparable rule.45 
Notwithstanding the MRA and its state counterparts, some public 
enforcers are authorized by statute to retain a portion of the money re-
covered through enforcement, whether as a result of settlement or 
judgment.  For example, the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act of 199646 (HIPAA) created a revolving fund called the 
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account.47  The Account is 
funded, in part, by the proceeds of public enforcement, including crim-
inal fines and forfeited assets recovered in cases involving federal 
health care offenses and civil penalties and assessments imposed in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 42 Cf. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 
12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992) (“[T]his brief paper . . . provides insight into the mean-
inglessness of the concept of ‘legislative intent.’  Individuals have intentions and purpose and mo-
tives; collections of individuals do not.  To pretend otherwise is fanciful.”). 
 43 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b) (2006).  
 44 Id.   
 45 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 37.10.060 (2012) (“All fees and receipts received by the Depart-
ment of Revenue from any source shall be deposited in the state treasury at least once each 
month . . . .”); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-12-92 (1990) (“All departments, agencies, and budget units 
charged with the duty of collecting taxes, fees, assessments, or other moneys . . . shall pay all rev-
enues collected by them into the state treasury on a monthly basis . . . .”  Id. § 45-12-92(a)); IND. 
CODE § 4-6-2-4 (2013) (“It shall be the duty of the attorney-general to . . . pay over to the proper 
officer all money collected at the end of each month . . . .”); id. § 4-8.1-2-6 (“Before moneys may be 
deposited in the state treasury, the treasurer of state must receive from the person or agency mak-
ing the deposit a report of collections due the state treasury . . . .”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-706 
(1989 & Supp. 2012) (“All moneys received by the attorney general belonging to this state shall be 
remitted to the state treasurer . . . [who] shall deposit the entire amount in the state treasury to the 
credit of the state general fund.”). 
 46 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 47 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
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health care cases, including Social Security and False Claims Act48 
cases.49  The funds are used by federal agencies to support further en-
forcement of health care–related federal law.50  The legislative history 
of the HIPAA contains no serious debate over the revolving fund, re-
vealing only bland references to the fund as a “stable funding source” 
that will “provide[] increased resources”51 for the relevant agencies, fa-
cilitating staff increases and other measures to aid “the fight against 
health care fraud and abuse.”52 
More recently, the American Jobs Creation Act of 200453 author-
ized the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to employ private collection 
agencies (PCAs) to recover certain types of unpaid taxes.54  The Act 
provides that the IRS may use up to twenty-five percent of the recov-
ered funds to compensate the PCAs, and may use another twenty-five 
percent to support its own “collection enforcement activities.”55  The 
idea of using PCAs to collect unpaid taxes was proposed by the Bush 
Administration as a means of raising revenue without raising taxes or 
further stretching the resources of the beleaguered IRS.56  It was ex-
tremely controversial,57 and Congress held further hearings in 2007 to 
address ongoing complaints about the program.58  By contrast, the 
provision permitting the IRS to retain a portion of the proceeds  
to fund its own enforcement has generated hardly a peep of public  
protest.59 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 48 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3731 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 49 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(2)(C). 
 50 Id. § 1395i(k)(3).  The relevant agencies are HHS, the DOJ, and the Federal Bureau of  
Investigation. 
 51 KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN & JENNIFER O’SULLIVAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-
895 A, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF LAW AND FEDERAL ANTI-FRAUD 
ACTIVITIES 11 (1997). 
 52 Thomas W. Brunner & Kirk J. Nahra, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, The Anti-Fraud Implications 
of the Clinton Health Care Proposal, in Deceit that Sickens America: Health Care Fraud and Its 
Innocent Victims: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 105, 109 (1994). 
 53 Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 54 26 U.S.C. § 6306 (2006). 
 55 Id. § 6306(c)(1). 
 56 See Use of Private Collection Agencies to Improve IRS Debt Collection: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of 
Rep. Amo Houghton, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight) (“[T]he IRS estimates that $78 billion 
of the total inventory of outstanding tax liabilities is potentially collectable.  The IRS has deter-
mined also that it lacks the resources, however, to pursue much of the unpaid taxes.”). 
 57 See Jeffrey B. Tate, Debt and Taxes: A Look at the IRS Private Debt Collection Program, 
116 TAX NOTES 583 (2007) (“The use of PCAs has been highly controversial.”). 
 58 See The Internal Revenue Service’s Use of Private Debt Collection Companies to Collect 
Federal Income Taxes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 59 The provision in question was part of a substitute bill proposed by Senator John McCain; it 
appeared in the version of the bill passed by the Senate, but there was no equivalent in the House 
version.  The Senate provision was retained in the bill voted out of the conference committee, but 
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Revolving funds are even more common at the state level, where 
state attorneys general often are allowed to “eat what [they] kill.”60  
For example, many states permit the office of the attorney general to 
retain a specified percentage of the damages and civil penalties ob-
tained through enforcement of state and federal antitrust laws,61 and 
many others have similar provisions linked to the enforcement of state 
consumer protection, false claims, and related statutes.62  Other states 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
there is no meaningful discussion in the conference report.  See H.R. REP. NO. 108-755, at 742 
(2004) (“The conference agreement follows the House bill, with the addition of two provisions 
from the Senate amendment: (1) the conference agreement provides that up to 25 percent of 
amount collected may be used for IRS collection enforcement activities; and (2) the conference 
agreement requires Treasury to provide a biennial report to Congress.  The conferees expect that, 
consistent with best management practices and sound tax administration principles, the Secretary 
will utilize this new debt collection provision to the maximum extent feasible.”).  One article, gen-
erally critical of the use of PCAs for tax collection, devotes only three sentences to the provision 
permitting the IRS to retain a portion of the funds.  See Tate, supra note 57, at 591 (“Further, the 
private collection program improperly distorts the incentives of the IRS.  Although the IRS is 
normally not permitted to retain any of the funds it collects for its own budget, the code authoriz-
es the IRS to retain up to 25 percent of the amount collected under the program . . . .  Therefore, 
the IRS will have a greater incentive to use PCAs to collect unpaid taxes than to use IRS person-
nel, even if using IRS employees would be less costly.”). 
 60 PETER J. BRANN, COLUMBIA LAW SCH. STATE ATT’Y GEN. PROJECT, STATE ATTOR-
NEYS GENERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER A NEW ADMINISTRATION: NEW OP-
PORTUNITIES AND NEW CHALLENGES 5 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at  
h t t p : / / w w w . l a w . c o l u m b i a . e d u / n u l l ? & e x c l u s i v e = f i l e m g r . d o w n l o a d & f i l e _ i d = 5 5 8 3 3 & r t c o n t e n t d i s p o s i t i.  
Revolving funds in the states are not just common; they are longstanding.  For example, Oregon 
established an antitrust revolving fund for the attorney general in 1965, and expanded it into a 
more general-purpose fund in 1993.  OR. REV. STAT. § 180.095 (2011) (Department of Justice Pro-
tection and Education Revolving Account); see also OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF STATE, 
OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE OVERVIEW 9–10 (2007), available at 
h t t p : / / a r c w e b . s o s . s t a t e . o r . u s / d o c / r e c m g m t / s c h e d / s p e c i a l / s t a t e / o v e r v i e w / 2 0 0 6 0 0 1 1 d o j a d o v . p d f 
(including a chronology of Oregon’s changes to the fund). 
 61 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-191.01 (2013) (depositing greater of ten percent of 
antitrust recoveries or actual amount expended into revolving fund); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE 
§ 16750(f) (West 2008) (capping the deposit at the greater of ten percent of antitrust recoveries 
plus attorneys’ fees or actual amount expended into revolving fund); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-715 
(1996 & Supp. 2012) (depositing twenty percent of antitrust recoveries into revolving fund); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 416.081 (2000) (paying ten percent of antitrust recoveries into revolving fund for the 
payment of all costs and expenses incurred by the attorney general in investigating, prosecuting, 
or enforcing state or federal laws relating to antitrust, trade regulation, restraint of trade, or price-
fixing activities); NEV. REV. STAT. § 598A.260 (2011) (depositing all attorneys’ fees and costs and 
fifty percent of all recoveries from enforcement of statutes pertaining to unfair trade practices into 
the “Attorney General’s Special Fund” to be used for payment of the expenses of enforcement, id. 
§ 598A.260(1)(a)); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-19 (West 2012) (creating revolving fund from proceeds 
of antitrust enforcement under state or federal law, to be used for further antitrust enforcement); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 109.82 (LexisNexis 2007) (depositing ten percent of antitrust recoveries 
plus fees and costs into revolving fund); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.10.215 (2012) (transferring anti-
trust fees and funds transferred to revolving fund pursuant to court order or judgment in antitrust 
actions; attorney general may expend funds for costs associated with antitrust enforcement).   
 62 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-202 (2011) (creating supplemental civil penalties ($10,000 
for each violation) for deceptive trade practices committed against elder or disabled persons, and 
providing that those penalties “shall be . . . placed into the Elder and Disabled Victims Fund, a 
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have established all-purpose revolving funds for the support of the of-
fice of the attorney general, which are funded by the proceeds of any 
civil litigation conducted by the attorney general and may be used for 
the performance of any of the powers or duties of the office.63  Such 
civil enforcement provisions have flown almost entirely under the aca-
demic radar, even as commentators have heaped critical attention on 
similar provisions governing the forfeiture of assets in criminal law.   
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
special fund created in the State Treasury and administered by the Attorney General for the in-
vestigation and prosecution of deceptive acts against elder and disabled persons and for consumer 
education initiatives”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17206(c)–(d) (West 2008 & Supp. 2013) 
(providing that funds recovered by attorney general through consumer protection litigation must 
be used to further enforce consumer protection law); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12652(g)(1) (West 2011 
& Supp. 2013) (providing that thirty-three percent of funds recovered by the attorney general 
through false claims litigation shall be used to support ongoing investigation and prosecution of 
false claims); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7508(c) (providing that ten percent of any recovery is depos-
ited in false claims litigation revolving funds and can then be used to hire staff and otherwise 
fund enforcement efforts, including the retainer of counsel outside the attorney general’s office); 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 46:440.1 (2010) (providing that “all monies received by the state pursuant to 
a civil award granted or settlement under the provisions of this Part, except for the amount to 
make the medical assistance programs whole, shall be deposited into” the Medical Assistance Pro-
grams Fraud Detection Fund, with fifty percent allocated to the Medicaid Fraud Control Unit 
within the office of the attorney general and fifty percent allocated to the Department of Health 
and Hospitals to be used solely for Medicaid fraud detection); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:32C-7(c) 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2013) (“The Attorney General shall receive a fixed 10% of the proceeds in any 
action or settlement of the claim that it brings, which shall be deposited in the ‘False Claims 
Prosecution Fund’ established in section 13 of this act and shall only be used to support its ongo-
ing investigation and prosecution of false claims pursuant to the provisions of this act.” (footnote 
omitted)); id. § 2A:32C-13 (establishing the False Claims Prosecution Fund and providing for ten 
percent of false claims recoveries to be deposited there, id. § 2A:32C-13(a), as well as “25% of the 
State share of monies recovered from actions related to false or fraudulent Medicaid claims 
brought pursuant to this act in the ‘Medicaid Fraud Control Fund,’” id. § 2A:32C-13(b), estab-
lished by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-62 (West 1997 & Supp. 2013)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-12-18 
(2008) (providing that all civil penalties collected by the attorney general regarding any consumer 
protection or antitrust matter shall be deposited into the Attorney General Refund Fund, which 
may be used, among other purposes, “[t]o pay costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees and salaries in-
curred in the operation of the consumer protection division,” id. § 54-12-18(4)); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 4-18-104(g) (2011) (providing that the office of the attorney general shall receive thirty-
three percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of non-Medicaid false claims cases, which 
“shall be used to support its ongoing investigation and prosecution of false claims,” id. § 4-18-
104(g)(1)(A)); see also BRANN, supra note 60, at 5 (“In some States, the consumer protection divi-
sion [of the attorney general’s office] is funded, often to a significant extent, by recoveries obtained 
by the division . . . .”). 
 63 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 36-15-4.2 (2001 & Supp. 2013) (all civil recoveries); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 109.081 (LexisNexis 2007) (up to eleven percent of any civil recovery); see also LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:259 (2012) (instructing the treasurer to pay into the DOJ Legal Support 
Fund a portion of the proceeds recovered by the attorney general in civil litigation on behalf of 
the state, so long as the balance of the fund does not exceed ten million dollars, to be used for “de-
fraying the costs of expert witnesses, consultants, contract legal counsel, technology, specialized 
employee training and education, and public education initiatives,” id. § 49:259(C)). 
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Asset forfeiture has a long historical pedigree, predating the Ameri-
can Revolution,64 but it expanded dramatically with a series of statuto-
ry changes beginning in 1970.  In that year, Congress passed two ma-
jor forfeiture provisions.  First, as part of the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970,65 the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act66 (RICO) authorized forfeiture of any interest acquired or 
maintained by a criminal defendant as a result of a RICO violation.67  
Second, Congress adopted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 197068 and created a forfeiture provision in cases 
involving narcotics.69  The scope of forfeiture was initially limited.  
Only the seized drugs, manufacturing equipment, and items used to 
transport narcotics were eligible.  However, Congress expanded the list 
of forfeitable items through the late 1970s into the mid-1980s.  The list 
of forfeitable property now includes vehicles and real property used in 
a narcotics crime as well as the proceeds of narcotics activities.70  
Comparable provisions exist at the state level, permitting forfeiture of 
the property and money used in criminal activity.71 
Of equal importance, in 1984 Congress amended federal law to 
permit the DOJ to retain control of the proceeds of asset forfeiture ra-
ther than turning them over to the general treasury pursuant to the 
MRA.  The Senate Report on the 1984 amendments indicates that leg-
islators were dissatisfied “that Federal law enforcement agencies had 
not aggressively pursued forfeiture”72 and saw the creation of a revolv-
ing fund as a way to encourage more robust use of the expanding stat-
utory provisions for asset forfeiture.73 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 64 See generally Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on 
Drugs: Lessons from Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 93 (1996) (outlining his-
tory of forfeiture).  
 65 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 992 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 66 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012). 
 67 Id. § 1963(a); see Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (describing purpose of the 
RICO forfeiture provisions).   
 68 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2012).  
 69 Id. § 881.  
 70 In the Psychotropic Substances Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-633, 92 Stat. 3768 (codified in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.), Congress authorized the forfeitures of proceeds traceable to nar-
cotics transactions, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).  Six years later, the statute was amended to include real 
property.  Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, § 306, 98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881(a)(7)).  See generally Eric Blumenson & Eva Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s 
Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 44–45 (1998) (describing statutory changes).     
 71 See generally DEE R. EDGEWORTH, ASSET FORFEITURE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (2d ed. 2008). 
 72 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 191 (1983). 
 73 Id. at 216 (“Presently, when any amounts are realized by the United States from the forfei-
ture of drug-related assets, these amounts must be deposited in the general fund of the Treasury.  
Therefore, they are not available to defray the expenses of forfeiture in those cases where the ex-
penses associated with the forfeiture of a particular piece of property exceed the amount realized 
by the sale of the property.”).  
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The amendments worked: the amounts forfeited are significant and 
growing.  In 1985, the DOJ’s Asset Forfeiture Fund saw deposits of 
only $27 million.74  From 2003 to 2011, annual revenues to the Fund 
increased from $500 million to $1.8 billion.75  The DOJ is authorized 
by law to use the forfeited funds for a variety of law enforcement pur-
poses.76  State forfeiture laws frequently have similar provisions that 
dedicate forfeited funds to law enforcement use rather than requiring 
that the money be turned over for general public use.77 
Commentary on the current statutory schema for asset forfeiture is 
overwhelmingly critical, as scholars argue that allowing law enforce-
ment to retain the forfeited assets creates perverse incentives for en-
forcers to pursue the most valuable assets rather than the most dan-
gerous criminals.78  For example, purchasers of narcotics are likely to 
possess cash that can be seized, forfeited, and converted to law en-
forcement use.  Sellers, on the other hand, are likely to possess the 
drugs themselves.  While the drugs can be forfeited, law enforcement 
cannot reap any economic benefit from the seizure.  As a result, forfei-
ture provisions may increase the relative share of drug arrests that in-
volve buyers and reduce the fraction that target sellers.79   
More generally, critics argue that the criminal asset-forfeiture pro-
visions encourage law enforcement to shift investigatory resources to-
ward cases with forfeitable assets and away from cases that are less 
likely to be lucrative.  The primary consequence, in these commenta-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 74 Eric Moores, Note, Reforming the Civil Asset Forfeiture Act, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 783 
(2009). 
 75 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-736, JUSTICE ASSETS FORFEITURE 
FUND: TRANSPARENCY OF BALANCES AND CONTROLS OVER EQUITABLE SHARING 
SHOULD BE IMPROVED 11 (2012), available at www.gao.gov/assets/600/592349.pdf.   
 76 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (describing permitted uses).  In practice, per-
haps the most significant use comes through “equitable sharing” of seized assets with state and 
local law enforcement.  When joint state-federal investigations lead to forfeiture, the Asset Forfei-
ture Fund turns over some or all of the seized funds to the nonfederal partner in the investigation.  
Id.  Even in purely state and local investigations, states may request that federal officials “adopt” 
the case if it involves property that can be forfeited federally.  Such adoptions may occur, for ex-
ample, if federal forfeiture provisions are more favorable to law enforcement than the comparable 
state law.  In such cases, the bulk of the forfeited funds are returned to the state or local authority 
and the Asset Forfeiture Fund retains only a small portion.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO 
EQUITABLE SHARING FOR STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 12 (2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ri/projects/esguidelines.pdf. 
 77 For a (perhaps dated) fifty-state survey, see Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 70, at 52 n.66 
(identifying the share of forfeited funds retained by law enforcement in each state as of 1998).  For 
a more recent look, see Marian R. Williams, Research Note, Civil Asset Forfeiture: Where Does 
the Money Go?, 27 CRIM. JUST. REV. 321, 321 (2002) (“[A] vast majority of states (88 percent) as 
well as the federal government explicitly allow law enforcement agencies to benefit from the ‘war 
on drugs’ by keeping the proceeds from civil asset forfeitures.”).  
 78 See, e.g., Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 70, at 66; Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 64, 
at 89.  
 79 See Blumenson & Nilsen, supra note 70, at 67. 
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tors’ view, is that police are induced to focus more on narcotics cases 
and less on other types of crimes.80  Thus, critics contend that the  
asset-forfeiture provisions serve to expand and perpetuate the so- 
called “War on Drugs,” by giving law enforcement a direct stake in the  
legal status quo and preventing level-headed assessments of policy  
alternatives.81 
The problems with asset forfeiture are real; we discuss them in 
more detail in Part III.  The important point for present purposes is 
that such problems extend well beyond the narrow swath of criminal 
law enforcement on which commentators have focused.  Although vir-
tually all of the scholarship on asset forfeiture centers on drug policy, 
statutory provisions authorizing public enforcers to retain forfeited as-
sets appear in many other contexts — both civil and criminal — that 
have escaped notice thus far.  For example, federal law provides that 
the proceeds of any civil forfeiture carried out by the U.S. Postal Ser-
vice shall be deposited in a Postal Service Fund that the Service may 
use to cover any expenses it incurs in carrying out its functions, includ-
ing law enforcement.82  The Department of the Treasury has a similar 
revolving fund, which is populated by “seizures and forfeitures made 
pursuant to any law . . . enforced or administered by the Department 
of the Treasury or the United States Coast Guard.”83  And the DOJ 
Asset Forfeiture Fund consists of “all amounts from the forfeiture of 
property under any law enforced or administered by the Department 
of Justice.”84 
Moreover, it is increasingly common for federal and (especially) 
state law to permit public enforcers to retain a portion of the money 
recovered through civil judgments or negotiated settlements.  Just as 
asset forfeiture provisions create incentives for enforcers to maximize 
forfeitures, such enforcement-funded revolving funds create incentives 
for enforcers to maximize financial recoveries.  At least since William 
Niskanen’s seminal 1971 book,85 scholars have recognized that agency 
heads often seek to maximize their institutions’ budgets — or at least 
the “discretionary” portion of the budget, representing “the difference 
between the total budget and the minimum cost of producing the out-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 See Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 64, at 90. 
 81 See John L. Worrall, Addicted to the Drug War: The Role of Civil Asset Forfeiture as a 
Budgetary Necessity in Contemporary Law Enforcement, 29 J. CRIM. JUST. 171, 182–83 (2001).  
 82 39 U.S.C. § 2003 (2006); see also id. § 404(a)(7) (providing that the Postal Service may de-
posit into the revolving fund one-half of “all penalties and forfeitures imposed for violations of 
law affecting the Postal Service, its revenues, or property”). 
 83 31 U.S.C. § 9703(a) (2006). 
 84 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(4)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (emphasis added).   
 85 WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUREAUCRACY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971). 
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put expected by” the agency’s legislative and executive overseers.86  
Agency officials, so the theory goes, care about “salary, perquisites of 
the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, 
ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau” — all of 
which depend in some respect on the size of the agency’s budget.87  
Lower-level agency employees share their bosses’ interest in budget 
maximization because the benefits of a larger budget trickle down to 
them in the form of enhanced career opportunities.88 
Enforcement-funded revolving funds and the like will tend to en-
hance the budgets for public enforcers in one of two ways.  First and 
most obviously, the proceeds of enforcement may supplement any 
monies appropriated to the agency by the legislature, increasing the 
overall resources available to the agency.  Indeed, some revolving-fund 
provisions specify that the fund cannot be used to replace or supplant 
appropriations from the legislature.89  Even in the face of such a statu-
tory prohibition, however, one might suspect that budgeting author- 
ities would consider any funds already available to public enforcers  
when setting their budgets for coming years.  There is some evidence  
that state and local budget authorities cut appropriations in response  
to law enforcement seizures of valuable forfeitable assets.90  And some  
revolving-fund provisions make the interdependence of legislative ap-
propriations and enforcement recoveries explicit.91 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 86 William A. Niskanen, A Reflection on Bureaucracy and Representative Government, in 
THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE 13, 18 (André Blais 
& Stéphane Dion eds., 1991). 
 87 NISKANEN, supra note 85, at 38. 
 88 Id. at 40. 
 89 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:259 (2012) (creating DOJ Legal Support Fund, compris-
ing up to $10 million of “proceeds recovered by the attorney general on behalf of the state from 
court judgments, settlements, fines, fees, forfeitures and penalties,” id. § 49:259(A), and providing 
that “[m]onies appropriated from the fund shall be used to supplement the Department of Justice 
budget and shall in no way be used to displace, replace, or supplant appropriations from the state 
general fund for operations of the Department of Justice below the level of state general fund ap-
propriations for that department in the current fiscal year,” id. § 49:259(C)).  
 90 See Katherine Baicker & Mireille Jacobson, Finders Keepers: Forfeiture Laws, Policing In-
centives, and Local Budgets, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2113, 2135 (2007) (reporting that budget authori-
ties cut appropriations in response to law enforcement seizures and that law enforcement increas-
es forfeiture activity as a result). 
 91 For example, the Alabama Attorney General enjoys the use of a “special fund,” ALA. CODE 
§ 36-15-4.2(a) (2001 & Supp. 2013), comprising money collected by the Attorney General in certain 
cases “as a result of any fees, fines, restitution, forfeitures, penalties, costs, interest, or judgments 
collected pursuant to any civil litigation,” id. § 36-15-4.2(b).  The authorizing statute earmarks the 
funds: 
for the use of the office of the Attorney General in the fiscal year in which the sums are 
received in a total cumulative amount of 50 percent of the sum allocated to the office of 
the Attorney General from the State General Fund for that fiscal year and may retain 
and carryover up to 125 percent of the sum allocated to the office of the Attorney Gen-
eral from the State General Fund to the next fiscal year, which shall be taken into ac-
count by the Legislature in future appropriations.  
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Regardless of the text of the relevant statutes, therefore, money col-
lected through enforcement may often offset, rather than supplement, 
legislative appropriations.  But that reality does not remove enforcers’ 
maximizing incentives.  On the contrary, it may tend to make law en-
forcement even more dependent on asset forfeitures and other remu-
nerative forms of enforcement.  Not surprisingly, surveys of state and 
local law enforcement agencies suggest that agencies view themselves 
as at least partially dependent on income from asset forfeiture,92 and 
empirical research shows that enforcers increase forfeiture activity in 
response to cuts in legislative appropriations.93  
The intuitions behind those findings are simple.  Like all individu-
als and institutions, agencies become accustomed to a certain budget 
level — a “standard of living,” so to speak.  In order to formulate their 
annual budget requests, agencies have to make predictions about their 
activities and needs in the coming fiscal year.  For agencies with access 
to revolving funds, such forecasts may involve assumptions about how 
much money the agency will collect through enforcement.  If an agen-
cy fails to meet the projected benchmarks, it may be left with a budget 
shortfall — even if the legislative appropriation remains unchanged.94  
The situation becomes even more stark if a legislative appropriation 
decreases (or was inadequate to begin with).  Suppose that an agency’s 
budget for enforcement in year one is ten, consisting of seven from the 
legislature and three from enforcement.  And suppose that the legisla-
ture cuts its appropriation to six for year two.  The agency likely will 
try to increase its enforcement proceeds to four, in order to main- 
tain its current levels of staffing, salaries, and so on.  Thus, even if  
enforcement-funded revolving funds lead to decreases in legislative 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Id. 
 92 See Worrall, supra note 81, at 182; Sarah Henry, The Thin Green Line, CAL. LAW., Sept. 
1994, at 46, 52 (quoting an official in the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department as stating that 
asset forfeiture funds are “the only thing that has kept the department going since the state’s 
budgetary crisis started three years ago” (quoting Dan Greenblat, Special Assistant to the Sheriff) 
(internal quotation mark omitted)); Sean P. Murphy, More Dealer Forfeits Being Used to Fight 
Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 12, 1990, at 21 (noting that the four-person forfeiture unit at the 
U.S. Attorney’s Office in Boston realized a net gain of $6 million in 1989, and quoting Middlesex 
County District Attorney Scott Harshbarger as stating that $750,000 taken from drug dealers in 
1989 helped the county avoid layoffs in the face of a $1.1 million cut in state funding).  
 93 See Baicker & Jacobson, supra note 90, at 2135.  
 94 See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 56 n.2 (1993) (“The extent 
of the Government’s financial stake in drug forfeiture is apparent from a 1990 memo, in which 
the Attorney General urged the United States Attorneys to increase the volume of forfeitures in 
order to meet the Department of Justice’s annual budget target: . . . ‘Failure to achieve the $470 
million projection would expose the Department’s forfeiture program to criticism and undermine 
confidence in our budget projections.  Every effort must be made to increase forfeiture income 
during the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990.’” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Administrative Issues, 38 U.S. ATT’Y BULL. 163, 180 (1990))). 
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appropriations, they may encourage more aggressive enforcement go-
ing forward.95  
Second, a legislature is likely to allocate more money to an agency 
if it does not have to “pay for” the entire amount.  Consider two hypo-
thetical scenarios: In one, all of the funds for an agency’s annual budg-
et must be appropriated from the general treasury, and thus traded off 
against competing uses.  In the second scenario, only half of the agen-
cy’s budget will come from the treasury; the other half is already in the 
agency’s possession.  It stands to reason that the legislators will more 
readily agree to a higher budget in the second scenario, because fewer 
budgetary tradeoffs need to be made.96 
Finally and most generally, enforcement-funded revolving funds 
may lead to higher budgets if the collecting agencies are favorably per-
ceived as “paying for [themselves].”97  Legislators are likely to take a 
rosy view of agencies that are able to produce results while demanding 
less money through appropriations.  Such agencies will appear as val-
uable partners rather than drags on the public fisc.  And when agen-
cies bring in as much money as is spent on them, that may encourage 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 95 The discussion here focuses on the incentives of public enforcers.  We bracket the question 
of whether agencies whose missions are dominated by goals other than enforcement will share the 
same rosy vision of a revolving fund that is earmarked for enforcement purposes — particularly if 
the success of such a fund prompts cuts in appropriated funds that might have been devoted to 
other uses.  We note, however, that such a scenario seems unlikely in light of the fact that agencies 
typically itemize their budget requests to a certain extent (for example, X for enforcement efforts, 
Y for prevention efforts, and so forth).  See, e.g., U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, 
2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST 3–4 (2012); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra  
note 1, at 51. 
 96 It bears emphasis that neither of these points depends on the enforcement agency retaining 
full (or even partial) control over the proceeds of enforcement; it is enough that those proceeds are 
in a special fund earmarked for the agency, even if they are controlled by the legislature.  See, e.g., 
FLA. STAT. § 16.53 (2012) (creating a “Legal Affairs Revolving Trust Fund” that is populated with 
the proceeds of antitrust, false claims act, and RICO enforcement by the Attorney General and 
controlled by the state legislature — which can appropriate funds from the trust “for the purpose 
of funding investigation, prosecution, and enforcement by the Attorney General of the provisions 
of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, the Florida Deceptive and Un- 
fair Trade Practices Act, the Florida False Claims Act, or state or federal antitrust laws,” id. 
 § 16.53(1) — and providing that “[a]ny moneys remaining in the fund at the end of any fiscal year 
in excess of 3 times the amount of the combined budgets for the antitrust and racketeering sec-
tions of the Attorney General’s office for the forthcoming fiscal year shall be transferred to the 
General Revenue Fund unallocated,” id. § 16.53(7)); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 48-606(5) (2008) (“All 
penalties, costs and fees recovered by the attorney general shall be remitted to the consumer pro-
tection fund . . . .  Moneys in the fund may be expended pursuant to legislative appropriation and 
shall be used for the furtherance of the attorney general’s duties and activities under this chapter.  
At the beginning of each fiscal year, those moneys in the consumer protection fund which exceed 
the current year’s appropriation plus any residual encumbrances made against prior years’ ap-
propriations by fifty percent (50%) or more shall be transferred to the general fund.”). 
 97 Ralph H. Folsom, State Antitrust Remedies: Lessons from the Laboratories, 35 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 941, 958 (1990) (“Public antitrust enforcement at the state and local levels is often per-
ceived as ‘paying for itself.’  In many instances this is quite literally true.”).   
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legislators to spend more — just as one devotes more money to in-
vestments with healthy returns. 
Not surprisingly, agencies take pains to convey to Congress — and 
to the public — the amounts deposited into any enforcement-funded 
revolving funds.  For example, HHS and the DOJ issue joint annual 
reports to Congress on the amount of money collected in health care 
fraud cases and proceedings.  Since the creation of the revolving fund 
in 1996, enforcement agencies have deposited between $480 million (in 
1998)98 and $4.2 billion (in 2012)99 each year into the Control Account.  
Most years have seen deposits of over $1 billion.  The annual reports 
highlight the numbers, and — more recently — calculate and empha-
size the “Return-on-Investment (ROI)” of the Health Care Fraud and 
Abuse Control Program, which created the fund.  The 2011 report 
boasts that the Program has returned $5.10 for every $1.00 expended 
on it.100  In 2012, the agencies reported that “for every dollar spent on 
health care-related fraud and abuse investigations in the last three 
years, the government recovered $7.90.”101 
Similarly, the Department of the Treasury makes annual reports to 
Congress about its Forfeiture Fund, which — as the name suggests — 
consists of forfeitures made pursuant to all but two laws enforced by 
the Department of the Treasury or the U.S. Coast Guard and may be 
used for specified law enforcement purposes.102  The Department’s 
2013 Congressional Budget Justification reports that the Fund: 
received close to $1 billion in forfeitures and recoveries in FY 2011 and is 
projected to have another year of robust collections in FY 2012.  The suc-
cess of Treasury’s asset forfeiture program allows the Department to make 
priority investments in law enforcement and national security, without re-
questing additional resources from taxpayers.  Further, it enables Treasury 
to contribute to deficit reduction with a proposed permanent cancellation 
of $830 million from the Forfeiture Fund’s unobligated balances.103 
Such reports of financial recoveries are likely to be music to the 
ears of budgeting authorities, particularly in times of financial difficul-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 98 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1998, at 2 (1999). 
 99 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 1 (2013). 
 100 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 8 (2012). 
 101 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Departments of Justice and Health 
and Human Services Announce Record-Breaking Recoveries Resulting from Joint Efforts to 
Combat Health Care Fraud (Feb. 11, 2013), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press 
/2013pres/02/20130211a.html. 
 102 31 U.S.C. § 9703(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 103 U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FY 2013 BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 
(2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/budget-in-brief/Documents 
/1.%20Executive%20Summary%20final.pdf. 
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ty and governmental belt-tightening.  Public enforcement programs 
that generate more money for government — and for taxpayers — 
than they cost will appeal not only to legislators who support the sub-
stance of the underlying program and hope for strong enforcement, but 
also to those who wish to minimize government spending or free up 
funds for other initiatives.  This dynamic is most obvious when the 
proceeds from enforcement go directly to the agency itself (thus requir-
ing a smaller legislative appropriation) or are earmarked specifically 
for the agency in the general treasury.  Importantly, however, it ex-
tends to agencies that must turn over their “winnings” to the general 
treasury pursuant to the MRA and its state counterparts.  We turn to 
that broader point next. 
2.  Reputational Rewards. — In addition to the direct financial in-
centives discussed in the previous section, agencies have reputational 
incentives to maximize the dollars imposed as financial sanctions.  
Agencies that reap large financial recoveries can develop reputations 
as strong and effective enforcers, and such reputations are often valu-
able.  This section first outlines why agencies might choose to empha-
size penalty size as a measure of enforcement quality and why external 
observers might accept such a metric.  Next, we describe when and 
why agencies might care about their enforcement reputations.  Finally, 
we explain why a focus on reputation helps makes sense of a puzzling 
pattern in public enforcement: the tendency of many agencies to an-
nounce large financial recoveries while failing to collect them. 
Agencies that want to demonstrate enforcement effectiveness con-
front a difficult challenge.  A core goal of enforcement is to prevent vi-
olations.  In order to measure prevention directly, however, agencies 
would have to count the number of violators deterred.  Such an ap-
proach would require measuring events that did not happen — a 
daunting task, to say the least.  Indirect measures have equally serious 
problems.  For example, an increase in the number of violations ob-
served by enforcement authorities (such as those reflected in the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports) could either be a 
success story or a clear example of failure: Perhaps improved investi-
gative techniques or increased trust of enforcement authorities made it 
possible to detect a greater fraction of violations — an indication of ef-
fective enforcement.  But it is equally possible that enforcers simply 
failed in their deterrence mission. 
The problem runs deeper still, because preventing violations is not 
agencies’ sole objective.  In some principal-agent contexts, the princi-
pal has a relatively straightforward task: set an appropriate goal for 
the agent and craft incentives and monitoring rules to ensure the agent 
achieves the goal.  In other contexts, however, agents are tasked with 
multiple heterogeneous goals.  Enforcement programs are a clear ex-
ample of multiple goals in the agency context.  Not only do most pub-
lic enforcers have a variety of goals other than enforcement, but effec-
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tive enforcement also requires careful case selection and calibration of 
penalties to avoid both under- and overdeterrence and to ensure effi-
cient use of investigatory resources.  It is easier to measure success at 
some of these goals than at others.  For example, the sanctions im-
posed are usually publicly disclosed; the amount of effort devoted to 
investigation is frequently obscure. 
A substantial literature has developed on the incentives that actors 
face when they choose among potential goals, some of which are easy 
to measure and others of which are more difficult.  All other things be-
ing equal, the more easily measured task will receive more emphasis 
and will be performed at a higher level.104  Effort placed toward the 
more easily measured result will produce more apparent successes 
while work toward other tasks will frequently be lost in the noise.  
Similarly, not working toward the measurable goals will produce  
clear evidence of failure, while a lack of effort toward the other tasks  
will not. 
As applied to public enforcement, the upshot is that agencies seek-
ing to build reputations as effective enforcers will tend to emphasize 
easily measurable accomplishments rather than more amorphous forms 
of success.105  As other commentators have observed, agencies have 
strong incentives to focus on quantifiable objectives like win rates and 
the number of enforcement actions initiated in a given time period.106  
Financial recoveries offer similar rewards to would-be reputation 
builders.  First, the amounts are simple to measure.  Financial penal-
ties are clear and indisputable because they are stated in dollars.  Pen-
alties also are easily comparable.  The size of penalties imposed by one 
agency can be contrasted to the size of penalties imposed by another 
agency (or by the same agency in different years).  This trait of penal-
ties takes on particular importance because other potential measures of 
enforcement effectiveness are not so easy to quantify.  Finally, agencies 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 104 See generally Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do: How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of 
Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 12 n.30 (2009) (collecting citations); Bengt 
Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset 
Ownership, and Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 24, 31–33 (1991). 
 105 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Distorting Incentives Facing the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 639 (2010) (“[T]he SEC tends to pursue high pro-
file matters, to change its priorities frequently in accordance with public opinion, and perhaps 
most significantly, to pursue readily observable objectives, often at the expense of more important 
but less observable objectives. . . . This inclination to value only what can be easily measured has 
not served the SEC well.”). 
 106 See, e.g., id. at 644–45 (noting the SEC’s reliance on case filings and fines collected as suc-
cess measures in the face of criticism); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance 
to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 135 (2004) (“[C]iting office-wide 
conviction rates is a tangible means for district attorneys to tout their performance to government 
authorities; offices may use conviction statistics as leverage in budget negotiations, trumpeting 
their records of success to support demands for greater resources.”). 
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possess all of the relevant data on civil penalties.  Agencies are apt to 
lean toward civil penalties and other numbers that, compared to other 
measures, do not require additional data collection. 
Unlike win rates and enforcement counts, moreover, financial re-
coveries purport to convey information about the size or importance of 
the agency’s enforcement program.  As we detail below, public enforc-
ers often are criticized for prioritizing small and simple cases while ig-
noring bigger and more significant violations.  Penalty amounts are — 
at best — an imperfect metric for gauging the importance of any given 
case.  Nevertheless, high recoveries (either in a single case or in the ag-
gregate) can make an enforcement program appear effective.  An agen-
cy that is trying to cultivate a reputation as an effective enforcer may 
therefore find special value in financial awards. 
Why would an agency desire such a reputation?  Part of the reason 
is endogenous to enforcement: general deterrence depends on potential 
violators believing that a regulatory response is likely.  Yet a reputa-
tion for effective enforcement is valuable to agencies for other reasons 
as well.107  Enforcers have audiences other than potential defendants.  
First, agencies are concerned about their reputations internally, among 
their own employees.  Employees working as part of an enforcement 
program who believe the program is effective and successful are likely 
to have higher job satisfaction and feel more engaged in serving the 
mission of the agency than are employees without such convictions.108  
As do high win rates, large penalties may help boost morale. 
Agencies also must consider external audiences, such as legisla-
tures, executive officials, and judges.109  Here the value of a strong en-
forcement record is more complicated.  On the one hand, agencies with 
strong enforcement reputations might develop more autonomy from 
oversight while agencies with weak reputations are more likely to have 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 107 For a short, general introduction to the literature on the role of agency reputation, see gen-
erally Daniel P. Carpenter & George A. Krause, Theory to Practice, Reputation and Public Ad-
ministration, 72 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 26 (2012). 
 108 See generally, e.g., Barbara S. Romzek, Public Service Motivation, Employee Investment 
and Commitment: The Ties that Bind, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 374 (1990); Yuan Ting, Determi-
nants of Job Satisfaction of Federal Government Employees, 26 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 313 
(1997); Bradley E. Wright, Essay on Work Motivation and the Workplace, Public Service and 
Motivation: Does Mission Matter?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 54 (2007); Bradley E. Wright & Sanjay 
K. Pandey, Public Service Motivation and the Assumption of Person-Organization Fit: Testing the 
Mediating Effect of Value Congruence, 40 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 502 (2008). 
 109 Agencies often need judicial approval for settlement agreements, for example.  Judges may 
demand less justification from agencies that have developed reputations as committed enforcers.  
Compare Lemos, supra note 39, at 503–04, 504 n.73 (describing how judges tend to defer to state 
attorneys general when asked to approve state settlements), with Edward Wyatt, Judge Rejects an 
S.E.C. Deal with Citigroup, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2011, at A1 (“Taking a broad swipe at the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission’s practice of allowing companies to settle cases without admit-
ting that they had done anything wrong, a federal judge on Monday rejected a $285 million set-
tlement between Citigroup and the agency.”). 
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their choices second-guessed.110  Agencies that are perceived as suc-
cessful also may reap important budgetary rewards.111 
On the other hand, vigorous enforcement may not always be desir-
able from the perspective of an agency’s political overseers.  Law en-
forcement is not an unalloyed good — its value depends on one’s 
views on a host of policy questions, including the wisdom and efficacy 
of the law in question, the social costs of enforcement, and so on.  En-
forcement, in other words, is political.112  A reputation for strong en-
forcement can thus be a benefit or a burden, depending on the direc-
tion of the political winds. 
Complicating matters further, the political valence of strong en-
forcement differs from issue to issue.  At the state level, for example, 
Republican and Democratic attorneys general alike take pains to pub-
licize their enforcement records, but they often emphasize different is-
sue areas.113  Accordingly, it makes no sense to ask whether a reputa-
tion for effective enforcement will endear enforcers to their political 
overseers; the operative question is enforcement of what, and the an-
swer will vary across agencies. 
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 110 For works establishing that agencies with better reputations earn more autonomy, see 
DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2001); Jason A. 
MacDonald, Limitation Riders and Congressional Influence over Bureaucratic Policy Decisions, 
104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 766, 780–81 (2010); Jason A. MacDonald & William W. Franko Jr., Bu-
reaucratic Capacity and Bureaucratic Discretion: Does Congress Tie Policy Authority to Perfor-
mance?, 35 AM. POL. RES. 790 (2007); and Patrick S. Roberts, FEMA and the Prospects for  
Reputation-Based Autonomy, 20 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 57, 81–83 (2006) (tracing the relationship 
over time between FEMA’s institutional reputation and the autonomy it was granted). 
 111 See, e.g., Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unru-
ly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 560 (2011) (“[I]n the 
1990s . . . the EPA and the DOJ focused on environmental enforcement, measuring success on the 
basis of convictions and penalties.  The agencies then used those statistics to obtain a larger budg-
et and hire more prosecutors.” (footnote omitted)). 
 112 There is a substantial, if inconclusive, literature examining the effects of political influence 
on agency outputs, including enforcement choices.  See generally Charles R. Shipan, Regulatory 
Regimes, Agency Actions, and the Conditional Nature of Congressional Influence, 98 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 467, 467–68 (2004) (collecting studies); David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agen-
cy Policymaking: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 
412–15, 414 n.28 (1997) (same).  For articles focused on the role of politics in agency enforcement, 
see, for example, Mark J. Moran & Barry R. Weingast, Paper, Congress as the Source of Regulato-
ry Decisions: The Case of the Federal Trade Commission, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 109, 111–12 (1982) 
(tracing the relationship between the composition of Congress and FTC policy); and Mary Olson, 
Substitution in Regulatory Agencies: FDA Enforcement Alternatives, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 376, 
377 (1996).  For studies focused specifically on the effects of executive politics on agency enforce-
ment, see Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 197, 197–98 (1982) (finding variation in enforcement efforts of National Labor Rela-
tions Board, FTC, and SEC based on presidential administration in office); and B. Dan Wood & 
Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 801, 823–24 (1991) (finding significant executive influence on the behavior of seven agencies, 
especially those situated within an executive department). 
 113 See Lemos, supra note 41, at 729–30, 730 n.145. 
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The value of a strong enforcement record also will vary across 
time, for at least two independent reasons.  The first is obvious: politi-
cal majorities are subject to change, so an enforcement record that 
gratifies today’s oversight committee may antagonize tomorrow’s.  The 
second reason has to do with public scrutiny.  When the public is pay-
ing attention, legislatures and executive officials are likely to press for 
stronger enforcement and reward agencies that carry out their wishes.  
But the public is not always paying attention.  Enforcement is often 
invisible to those who benefit from it — in public choice terms, en-
forcement typically works to the advantage of the “inattentive pub-
lic[].”114  By contrast, the targets of enforcement are always paying at-
tention to their regulators, even when the agencies do not make the 
news, and these targeted parties can place pressure on Congress and 
the executive branch to reduce the focus on enforcement.115  The main 
source of this political pressure shifts if public scrutiny is suddenly di-
rected toward an agency’s enforcement practices — in the wake of a 
well-publicized failure, for example.  For relatively high-profile agen-
cies, public scrutiny is more common than not (though it rises and falls 
depending on the salience of the agency’s activities).  At the federal 
level, for example, the DOJ and, to a lesser degree, the SEC both re-
ceive some level of press attention even in ordinary times and fre-
quently see the spotlight turned on their enforcement programs.116  
The same is largely true of state attorneys general, most of whom are 
popularly elected.117  Other enforcement agencies are outside of the 
public eye most of the time, and only a major catastrophe draws atten-
tion.  As a result, we might expect that higher-profile agencies will of-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 114 R. DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 68 (1990); see also id. 
at 64–71 (discussing the difference between “attentive” and “inattentive” publics and noting that 
the former tend to be more effective in influencing legislators). 
 115 In the case of state attorneys general, the pressure is likely to be even more direct.  See 
Lemos, supra note 41, at 728–29 (discussing the risk that elected state attorneys general may be 
influenced by firms that would otherwise be the targets of enforcement). 
 116 Empirical studies show an interesting shift in SEC enforcement practices following the 
highly publicized “collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and other subsequent corporate disasters.”  
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, Public and Private Enforcement of the Se-
curities Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 895 (2005).  
Pre-Enron, the SEC “was most concerned with fraud at companies experiencing financial distress, 
probably because of the greater likelihood that investors at those companies would suffer perma-
nent and irreversible losses.  It could also reflect a potential preference by the SEC to choose 
weak opponents.”  Id. at 905.  Post-Enron, the SEC appears to have shifted its focus to “seeking 
out frauds at companies where investors may have suffered larger losses, especially if they [we]re 
smaller firms. . . . [Among other factors,] public concern about fraudulent practices at the largest 
corporations could well have provided impetus for the SEC’s enforcement staff to involve itself 
with more ‘high profile’ cases than it otherwise would have engaged.”  Id. at 906. 
 117 See William P. Marshall, Essay, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys Gen-
eral, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006) (explaining 
that forty-three states provide for popular election of attorneys general). 
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ten (perhaps always) want to cultivate reputations as strong enforcers, 
while other agencies will seek to advertise their effectiveness if, and 
only if, the public is paying attention. 
These observations suggest that public enforcers have reputational 
incentives to prioritize financial recoveries, particularly during times of 
public scrutiny.  It should come as no surprise then, that agencies 
commonly seek press coverage based on the large size of their financial 
enforcement judgments.  In 2011 and 2012, for example, the SEC is-
sued nineteen press releases announcing the resolution of enforcement 
actions.118  All nineteen mention the financial penalties that the de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 118 The 2011 and 2012 SEC press releases are available at Press Release Archives 2011, U.S. 
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/news/press/pressarchive/2011press.shtml (last visit-
ed Nov. 24, 2013); and Press Releases, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/news 
/press/pressarchive/2012press.shtml (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).  The nineteen releases are: Press 
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Attorney, Wall Street Trader, and Middleman Settle SEC 
Charges in $32 Million Insider Trading Case (Apr. 25, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news 
/press/2012/2012-77.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, BP to Pay $525 Million Pen-
alty to Settle SEC Charges of Securities Fraud During Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (Nov. 15, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-231.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle SEC Charges for Misleading Investors 
About CDO Tied to Housing Market (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press 
/2011/2011-214.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Former Banco Santander Analyst 
Agrees to Settle Insider Trading Charges (Apr. 25, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news 
/press/2011/2011-98.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Former CEO to Return $2.8 
Million in Bonuses and Stock Profits Received During CSK Auto Accounting Fraud (Nov. 15, 
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-243.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, H&R Block Subsidiary Agrees to Pay $28.2 Million to Settle SEC Charges Relat-
ed to Subprime Mortgage Investments (Apr. 24, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News 
/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171488676; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Hedge Fund Manager to Pay $44 Million for Illegal Trading in Chinese Bank Stocks (Dec. 12, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-264.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Hong Kong Firm to Pay $14 Million to Settle Insider Trading Charges (Oct. 18, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-212.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, J.P. Morgan to Pay $153.6 Million to Settle SEC Charges of Misleading Investors 
in CDO Tied to U.S. Housing Market (June 21, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press 
/2011/2011-131.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Judge Orders Plastics Executive 
to Pay $49.5 Million in SEC Case (Dec. 22, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011 
/2011-275.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, MassMutual to Pay $1.625 Million Af-
ter SEC Investigation Highlights Prior Insufficient Disclosures About Annuity Product (Nov. 15, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-230.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Morgan Keegan to Pay $200 Million to Settle Fraud Charges Related to Sub-
prime Mortgage-Backed Securities (June 22, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press 
/2011/2011-132.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, N.Y.-Based Investment Advisory 
Firm and Founder Settle SEC Charges for Fraudulent Management of CDOS (Sept. 7, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-184.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, OppenheimerFunds to Pay $35 Million to Settle SEC Charges for Misleading State-
ments During Financial Crisis (June 6, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012 
/2012-110.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Obtains Settlement with CEO to 
Recover Compensation and Stock Profits He Received During Company’s Fraud (Mar. 3, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-61.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Sanctions Two Investment Advisers for Impeding Examinations (Nov. 20, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-238.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
 
  
2014] FOR-PROFIT PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 881 
fendant was required to pay.  In fourteen of the nineteen releases, the 
headline includes the penalty’s dollar value, suggesting that the agency 
viewed this fact as one of the key items that it hoped would be men-
tioned in any press coverage. 
In addition to individual actions, the SEC also attempts to draw at-
tention to the aggregate total of its enforcement settlements.  On its 
website, the agency maintains a set of “Key Statistics” on SEC en-
forcement related to the financial crisis, such as the number of indi-
viduals criminally charged and the more than $2.88 billion secured in 
“Total Penalties, Disgorgement, and Other Monetary Relief.”119 
Agencies do not just publicize the size of enforcement awards ge-
nerically; they also emphasize them in a targeted manner.  Federal 
agencies tout their enforcement successes to the most important 
decisionmaker, Congress, and do so in the budget context, perhaps the 
most significant consideration for agencies.  Most federal agencies 
submit annual budget requests to Congress, which requires them to se-
lect which budget increases to pursue and which agency actions to 
highlight.  Total penalties assessed are frequently emphasized in the 
discussions of agency enforcement programs.  For example, the CFTC 
has included that statistic since at least 2008.120  Similarly, in its FY 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Comm’n, Short Selling Brothers Agree to Pay $14.5 Million to Settle SEC Charges (July 17, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-137.htm; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 
17, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-112.htm; and Press Release, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Three Former Directors at Military Body Armor Supplier Settle SEC 
Charges (Nov. 10, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-238.htm.  
 119 SEC Enforcement Actions: Key Statistics (Through November 7, 2013), U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml#keyStatistics (last modified Nov. 7, 
2013).  As of November 24, 2013, the front page of the SEC website read “Financial Crisis En-
forcement Actions: The SEC has charged more than 160 firms and individuals, and secured $2.8 
billion for investors.”  U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov (last visited Nov. 24, 
2013). 
 120 CFTC budget requests are available on its website.  For the current year budget request, see 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE 
PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2014 (2013), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom 
/documents/file/cftcbudget2014.pdf.  For historical budget requests, see CFTC Historical Reports, 
U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/About/CFTCReports 
/cftcreports_historical (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).  For specific references to the total amounts col-
lected, see COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET AND PER-
FORMANCE PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 20 (2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm 
/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcbudget2013.pdf (“From FY 2002 to date, orders for 
more than $3 billion in civil monetary penalties, restitution and disgorgement have been imposed 
in Commission cases.”); COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 
AND PERFORMANCE PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 18–19 (2011), available at http://www.cftc 
.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file/cftcbudget2012.pdf (total penalties assessed 
over the previous five years broken down by substantive category); COMMODITY FUTURES 
TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE PLAN: FISCAL YEAR 2011, 
at 14–15 (2010), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/file 
/cftcbudget2011.pdf (total penalties assessed since 2001 broken down by substantive category); 
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2013 budget request, the SEC led with its enforcement activity.  The 
first agency success story on the initial page of the executive summary 
notes that the SEC “[f]iled 735 enforcement actions — more than ever 
filed in a single year in SEC history.  The SEC was better able to dis-
cover and stop illegal activity earlier and obtained more than $2.8 bil-
lion in penalties and disgorgement ordered in FY 2011.”121  The agen-
cy included similar language in the executive summary of the previous 
year’s budget request,122 although it had emphasized such statistics in-
consistently in earlier years.123 
Of course, not all agencies emphasize the total dollars assessed in 
their budget requests.  Whether they do so may be, in part, a function 
of the level of public scrutiny on their enforcement programs.  Agen-
cies ordinarily out of the public eye appear to be concerned about their 
enforcement reputations immediately following enforcement failures.  
For example, both the Mine Safety and Health Administration  
(MSHA)124 and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Admin-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, FY 2010 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET AND PERFOR-
MANCE PLAN 9–10 (2009), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents 
/file/2010budgetperf.pdf (same); COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, THE FY 2009 
PRESIDENT’S BUDGET & PERFORMANCE PLAN 5–6 (2008), available at http://www.cftc.gov 
/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/2009budgetperf.pdf (same); and COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, FY 2008 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE PLAN 5 
(2007), available at http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/2008budgetperf 
.pdf (same). 
 121 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 1, at 1. 
 122 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 
1 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy12congbudgjust.pdf (“In addition, in FY 
2010, the SEC returned $2.2 billion to harmed investors, twice the agency’s budget for that 
year.”). 
 123 The SEC provides eight years of budget requests on its website.  In addition to the requests 
for FY 2013 and FY 2012 referenced in the main text, the agency highlighted its recoveries in its 
budget requests for FY 2006 and FY 2007.  See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FIS-
CAL 2006 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST 8 (2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/about 
/secfy06budgetreq.pdf (“Over $3.5 billion in disgorgement and penalties has thus far been desig-
nated for return to harmed investors using Fair Funds created under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.”); 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF: FISCAL 2007 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET REQUEST 7 
(2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy07budgetreq.pdf (“The Commission prevailed 
in the great majority of the enforcement actions decided by district courts or administrative law 
judges, and a total of more than $3 billion in disgorgement and penalties was ordered in SEC en-
forcement cases.”).  In the remaining four years (that is, the budget requests for FY 2008–2011), 
the agency made no reference to the total penalties collected.  
 124 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: MINE 
SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 64 (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget 
/2013/pdf/cbj-2013-v2-13.pdf (“MSHA assessed not less than 157,000 violations totaling 
$146,000,000 in FY 2011.”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FY 2012 CONGRESSIONAL BUD-
GET JUSTIFICATION: MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 54 (2011), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/dol/budget/2012/PDF/CBJ-2012-V2-12.pdf (providing similar data for the 
previous fiscal year). 
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istration (PHMSA)125 gave penalty totals as a reason to enhance the 
agency budget for FY 2013.  Both agencies have had recent dramatic 
catastrophes within their regulatory areas that have led to increased 
public scrutiny on their enforcement programs.  In April 2010, the 
Upper Big Branch mine collapse killed twenty-nine workers and led to 
substantial public criticism of MSHA.126  Similarly, PHMSA faced 
scrutiny for the September 2010 and April 2011 pipeline explosions in 
California and Pennsylvania, which killed thirteen people total, as well 
as for the July 2010 pipeline leak near Marshall, Michigan, which 
caused $800 million in damage.127  Notably, similar agencies without 
recent high-profile disasters were silent on their penalty totals.  For ex-
ample, PHMSA is overseen by the Department of Transportation 
(DOT), and other agencies with civil penalty authority that fall under 
the DOT umbrella did not focus on their civil penalty totals in their 
most recent budget requests.128  MSHA’s sister agency, the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Administration, also made no mention of 
penalty amounts.129  This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that 
agencies’ incentive to build reputations as strong enforcers — and to 
use financial recoveries to substantiate their claims of vigorous ac- 
tion — is variable and depends on the level of public attention directed 
at the agencies’ enforcement programs. 
Here we confront a seeming puzzle, however.  Even when agencies 
publicly emphasize the dollar value of settlements and court awards, 
there is mounting evidence that they often fail to collect the money in 
question.  Professors Ezra Ross and Martin Pritikin recently surveyed 
a wide range of enforcement agencies to determine collection rates for 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 125 See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., BUDGET ESTIMATES: FISCAL YEAR 2013: PIPELINE AND 
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 45 (2012), available at http://www.phmsa 
.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/FY%202013%20PHMSA%20BUDGET.pdf (“In 2009, 
we proposed a total of $6.4 million in civil penalties, the second highest yearly total in agency his-
tory ($8.7 million proposed in 2008).”). 
 126 J. DAVITT MCATEER ET AL., UPPER BIG BRANCH: THE APRIL 5, 2010 EXPLOSION: A 
FAILURE OF BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY PRACTICES 4 (2011), available at http://www.nttc.edu 
/ p r o g r a m s & p r o j e c t s / m i n e s a f e t y / d i s a s t e r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s / u p p e r b i g b r a n c h / U p p e r B i g B r a n c h R e p o r t . p d f 
(noting collapse); id. at 77 (noting critique of MSHA). 
 127 Aaron Cooper & Chris Boyette, Feds: Operator Knew of Pipeline Problems Years Before 
Michigan Oil Spill, CNN (Jul. 11, 2012, 9:54 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/10/us/michigan 
-oil-spill-ntsb-findings/index.html.  
 128 See, e.g., FY2013 Budget Estimates, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/mission 
/budget/fy2013-budget-estimates (last updated Mar. 7, 2012) (providing links for the FY 2013 
budget estimate reports for the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, and Surface Transportation Board). 
 129 See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION: OC-
CUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (2012), available at http://www.dol 
.gov/dol/budget/2013/PDF/CBJ-2013-V2-12.pdf. 
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fines and civil penalties.130  They conclude that agencies systemically 
fail to collect the fines and penalties they impose.131  While agencies 
frequently kept incomplete data on their collection efforts, Ross and 
Pritikin were able to establish upper limits on the collections of nu-
merous agencies.  They found that many had collection rates in the 
single digits.132  The problem is not limited to civil enforcement: Ross 
and Pritikin estimate that substantially less than half of the amount 
imposed as criminal fines at the state and federal levels is ever collect-
ed133 and that the actual number may be much lower.  They note that 
the DOJ collected only about 4% of the fines imposed in federal crimi-
nal cases between 2000 and 2002 and that the number declined to 
3.3% in 2006.134 
Collection problems extend beyond agencies with weak enforce-
ment programs or judgment-proof defendants.  Collections are low 
even at the CFTC and the SEC.  These federal agencies are well fund-
ed, and their enforcement programs have the strongest reputations.  
They frequently target their enforcement actions against large defen-
dants with deep pockets.  As a result, the agencies impose penalties 
that rarely bankrupt defendants.  Despite all of these advantages, the 
weaknesses of penalty collection at these agencies have led to multiple 
investigations and reports by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) starting in 1998.135  Even after this scrutiny from the GAO, col-
lection rates remained relatively low.  In 2003, the GAO found that the 
SEC had levied over $480 million in penalties between 1997 and 2002 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 130 Ezra Ross & Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and 
White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 468 (2011). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 475 (5% collection rate for the Office of Surface Mining from 1986 to 1988 and from 
1997 to 2000; no greater than 7.4% collection rate for worker safety fines by the California De-
partment of Industrial Relations from 2004 to 2006).  Furthermore, agencies with collection rates 
that look relatively high compared to their counterparts sometimes achieve these figures by ex-
cluding debts from the calculation.  For example, U.S. Customs and Border Protection collected 
31% of its assessments from 1997 to 2000 but only reached that figure by writing off substantial 
portions of the debt assessed.  Including those write-offs, the collection rate for Customs fell to 
below 3%.  Id. at 477.  
 133 Id. at 474–75. 
 134 Id. at 477. 
 135 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-670, SEC AND CFTC PENALTIES: 
CONTINUED PROGRESS MADE IN COLLECTION EFFORTS, BUT GREATER SEC MAN-
AGEMENT ATTENTION IS NEEDED (2005) [hereinafter U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF- 
FICE, GAO-05-670]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-795, SEC AND CFTC FINES  
FOLLOW-UP: COLLECTION PROGRAMS ARE IMPROVING, BUT FURTHER STEPS ARE WAR-
RANTED (2003) [hereinafter U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-795]; U.S. GEN. AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-900, SEC AND CFTC: MOST FINES COLLECTED, BUT IM-
PROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE USE OF TREASURY’S COLLECTION SERVICE (2001); U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-99-8, MONEY PENALTIES: SECURITIES AND FU-
TURES REGULATORS COLLECT MANY FINES BUT NEED TO BETTER USE INDUSTRYWIDE 
DATA (1998).  
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but had collected only 40% of that amount, just over $190 million.136  
The CFTC had a comparable success rate.  By 2003, it had collected 
45% of the fine amounts imposed between 1997 and 2002.137  In 2005, 
the CFTC reported a similar total, collecting 46% of the fine amounts 
levied between September 2002 and the end of 2004.138  The SEC im-
proved to a 79% collection rate during that time period,139 but SEC 
staff were careful to note that the collection rate was high because the 
agency had targeted especially well-funded defendants.140 
This pattern of high publicity surrounding penalty imposition but 
limited efforts to collect is hard to square with a pure deterrence theo-
ry of enforcement.  Economic theories of deterrence assume that pun-
ishment is imposed, not just announced.  A deterrence strategy works 
by raising the costs of violations, and uncollected penalties do not  
directly affect costs.  Granted, publicity certainly can contribute to de-
terrence because it can help communicate to potential violators that 
misconduct will be punished.  In a world of imperfect information, 
would-be violators might be deterred by reports of crippling sanctions, 
unaware that little or no money ever changed hands.  Conceivably, 
then, an agency might conclude that it could achieve effective deter-
rence without wasting resources on collections.  The EPA has sought 
to defend its low collection rates along these lines.  The EPA resists 
calls to publicize its collections, explaining that it regards “reporting of 
assessed penalties alone to be of greater deterrent value than reporting 
both assessed and collected penalties.”141  As Ross and Pritikin explain, 
however, such an approach “is naïve, because it assumes that firms 
will not obtain information regarding collections if it is not publicly 
reported.  Firms, particularly those within an industry, communicate; 
and the attorneys who represent them are repeat players who gain 
knowledge and expertise regarding how an agency is likely to treat  
violators.”142 
Low collection rates also might be defended on the ground that 
successful enforcement actions may impose meaningful costs on viola-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 136 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-795, supra note 135, at 39. 
 137 See id. at 42.  The CFTC figures show dramatic year-by-year variation.  As of December 
2002, the agency collected ninety percent of the amount of the fines imposed in 1998 but only two 
percent of the amount imposed in 2000.  Id. 
 138 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-670, supra note 135, at 42. 
 139 See id. at 23. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Letter from Granta Y. Nakayama, Assistant Adm’r for Enforcement & Compliance Assur-
ance, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to David C. Maurer, Acting Dir., Natural Res. and Env’t, U.S. 
Gov’t Accountability Office (Sept. 11, 2008), in U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
08-1111R, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: EPA NEEDS TO IMPROVE THE ACCURACY 
AND TRANSPARENCY OF MEASURES USED TO REPORT ON PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 15, 
16 (2008). 
 142 Ross & Pritikin, supra note 130, at 480. 
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tors even if they never turn over any money to the relevant agency.  
For example, there is evidence that the mere fact of certain kinds of 
enforcement actions may cause the stock value of defendant firms to 
crater.  And both corporate and individual defendants may incur repu-
tational losses as a result of being targeted by public enforcers.143  
Agencies seeking to optimize deterrence might well take such indirect 
costs into account when setting penalties — or perhaps when deciding 
whether to devote resources to collection.  Nevertheless, we would not 
expect deterrence-focused agencies to leave quite as much money on 
the table as the Ross-Pritikin study suggests. 
By contrast, a reputation-based theory of enforcement can at least 
partially explain the observed behavior.  Agencies can appear effective 
through large, highly visible penalty assessments.  Collection of judg-
ments, though, can be relatively difficult, and the failure to put the 
work into finding the money usually goes unnoticed.  Agencies that 
must turn over the proceeds of enforcement to the general treasury are 
not financially harmed by a lack of collection: such agencies build  
their reputations up front and do not lose them when the penalties go  
uncollected.144 
It bears emphasis that all of the agencies in the Ross-Pritikin study 
were subject to the MRA or state equivalents: rather than keeping the 
spoils of enforcement for themselves, they were required to remit their 
winnings to the general treasury.  Matters are different for agencies 
that are permitted to retain all or some of their enforcement proceeds 
in a revolving fund or the like.  Those agencies are harmed — quite 
directly — by a lack of collection.  Thus, we would expect revolving-
fund agencies to do better than their counterparts at collecting the 
money they win through enforcement.145 
B.  Individual Incentives 
Agencies are not monoliths.  In the end, agency actions are the ac-
tions of individuals.  We have argued that agencies, as institutions, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 143 See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1763–64 
(2005) (describing spillover effects of enforcement on stock price and reputation). 
 144 In this respect, agencies’ reputational incentives diverge sharply from the more direct finan-
cial incentives of private enforcers.  Private enforcers care about collecting judgments, not just 
announcing them.  In contrast, while agencies might prefer collections, they might sometimes set-
tle for reputational benefits. 
 145 Together, HHS and the DOJ reported collection rates ranging from sixty percent to over one 
hundred percent during the life of the Control Account revolving fund.  (Annual reports on the 
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program are available at Health Care Fraud and Abuse 
Control Program Report, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://oig.hhs.gov/reports 
-and-publications/hcfac/index.asp (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).)  We hesitate to place too much 
stock in these numbers without more information about how they are calculated, but the available 
data are at least suggestive of a fairly robust collection program.   
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have self-interested incentives to emphasize monetary penalties in en-
forcement actions.  To what extent do those incentives translate to the 
enforcement decisions made by individual employees? 
Recall the theory of the “budget-maximizing bureaucrat” described 
in section II.A: high-level agency officials seek to maximize an agen-
cy’s discretionary budget so as to reap the resulting benefits of  
increased salary, reputation, power, ease of management, and so  
on.  Lower-level employees have similar interests — so the argument  
goes — because the benefits of a larger budget trickle down the orga-
nizational hierarchy in the form of enhanced career opportunities and 
other perquisites.146  If correct, this theory would provide an easy an-
swer to the question of individual employee incentives, at least for 
agencies that are permitted to retain all or some of the proceeds of en-
forcement.  There is scattered evidence of enforcement employees, par-
ticularly at the state and local level, reaping quite direct and personal 
benefits from asset forfeiture.147  To take just one example, a prosecu-
tor in Somerset County, New Jersey, reportedly used $6000 out of for-
feiture funds to pay for a corporate membership in a private tennis 
and health club for the benefit of his seventeen assistant prosecutors 
and fifty detectives.148  But outside some relatively extreme instances 
of funds being diverted from enforcement to personal use, there is rea-
son to doubt the trickle-down benefits of budget growth.149  While ef-
forts to verify Niskanen’s budget-maximization theory have provided 
“ample evidence that bureaucrats systematically request larger bud-
gets,” there is less evidence that tangible awards like salary increases 
and promotions follow from expanding budgets.150  Moreover, even if 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 146 See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
 147 See Susan R. Klein, Civil In Rem Forfeiture and Double Jeopardy, 82 IOWA L. REV. 183, 
219 & n.149 (1996) (“The restriction of the property to ‘law enforcement purposes’ apparently has 
not prevented agents and departments from enjoying their newfound riches for personal amuse-
ment.”  Id. at 219 (quoting Nkechi Taifa, Civil Forfeiture vs. Civil Liberties, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 95, 108 (1994))); see also Taifa, supra, at 108 (detailing abuses of money distributed from 
DOJ Asset Forfeiture Fund to local law enforcement agencies, including money disbursed to the 
Philadelphia Police Department that was spent on new air conditioning; a new Corvette turned 
over to Warren County, New Jersey, that was used by the Chief Assistant Prosecutor; funds dis-
bursed to Suffolk County, New York, that were used by the District Attorney to repair his person-
al car (which had also been obtained by forfeiture) and to buy a watch for a secretary and chairs 
for the office; and $1.3 million disbursed to the Lakewood, Colorado, police department that was 
used on Christmas parties, amusement park tickets, and a banquet to honor officers). 
 148 Jon Nordheimer, Seizure of Assets by an Aggressive Drug Fighter Raises Eyebrows, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, § 1, at 37. 
 149 See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 915, 932 (2005) (“[T]he relationship between a larger agency budget and higher salaries or 
cushier working conditions is empirically tenuous.”). 
 150 André Blais & Stéphane Dion, Conclusion: Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers?, in THE 
BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT, supra note 86, at 355, 355 (emphasis omitted); see also id. 
at 355–57. 
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it were clear that the agency’s interest in a bigger budget were shared 
throughout the ranks of employees, we would still need to consider 
whether — and how — the institution’s reputational interests are in-
ternalized by individual employees. 
A more promising way of approaching the inquiry into the incen-
tives of public enforcement attorneys is as one instance of the general 
principal-agent problem for organizational employees.151  Agency em-
ployees, like other workers in the public and private sectors, usually 
want to succeed at their jobs.  Success typically results from furthering 
the objectives of the larger organization.  If the agency sees financial 
recoveries as a core goal, we should assume that enforcement lawyers 
are going to pursue that goal for the same reasons that lawyers want to 
conduct good depositions, write persuasive briefs, and show up on 
time for court.  Employees care about these goals because of hard in-
centives, such as bonuses and termination, or soft pressures, like self-
motivation and peer pressure. 
Here too, however, matters are more complicated than they first 
appear.  The constraints on public employees differ from those on em-
ployees in the private sector.  Government employees face weaker in-
centives compared to employees of other organizations because both 
the downside threat of termination and the upside promise of addi-
tional compensation are reduced.  As a result, the principal-agent 
problem for public employees may be increased — though, as we ex-
plore below, the effect on the direction of penalties is unclear. 
The difference in the incentives for public employees as compared 
to the private sector employees is widely recognized.  Both the carrots 
and sticks are more limited.  Government lawyers are relatively un-
likely to be fired compared to their counterparts at private law firms.  
Public sector enforcement lawyers are frequently union members with 
the protections that come from negotiated collective bargaining agree-
ments.152  By contrast, union membership among lawyers at private 
firms is rare to nonexistent.153  On the other hand, compensation of 
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 151 See, e.g., Avinash Dixit, Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpreta-
tive Review, 37 J. HUM. RESOURCES 696, 697 (2002). 
 152 At the SEC, enforcement staff, as well as other agency employees, are represented by the 
National Treasury Employees Union Chapter 293.  See NTEU CHAPTER 293, http://www 
.secunion.org (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).  Enforcement staff also serve key roles in management 
of the Union, taking roles as officers and members of the executive board.  See Executive Board 
Directory, NTEU CHAPTER 293, http://www.secunion.org/directory-executive-board (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2013); Officers Directory, NTEU CHAPTER 293, http://www.secunion.org/directory 
-officers (last visited Nov. 24, 2013).   
 153 Nonsupervisory attorneys (including many associates) might generally be eligible to union-
ize, but it is uncommon for private sector lawyers to take such an action.  See Mitchell H. Rubin-
stein, Attorney Labor Unions, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., Jan. 2007, at 23, 27 (“While there is surprisingly 
little NLRB precedent with regard to attorneys, they are no different from other employees in the 
area of unionizing activity.”).  
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public sector enforcement lawyers stops growing at levels substantially 
below those of private sector attorneys.  Federal employees on the 
General Schedule, the most common compensation structure in the 
federal system, generally cap out their compensation when they reach 
Grade 15/Step 10.  Even with the locality adjustment, the maximum 
salary for lawyers working in Washington, D.C., is currently $155,500 
and has been frozen at that level since 2010.154  This maximum base 
salary is slightly lower than the $160,000 starting compensation for 
first-year associates at the nation’s largest law firms.155 
These factors and other considerations have led to the recognition 
that public employees have “low powered” incentives compared to pri-
vate employees.156  Positive or negative outcomes for public employers 
are less likely to produce positive or negative outcomes for their em-
ployees personally.  As a result, employees may engage in activities 
other than those desired by the principal.  These other activities have 
been usefully divided into three categories.157  Public employees might 
shirk and focus on leisure rather than work.  They might drift and 
emphasize their own preferences rather than agency goals.  Finally, 
they might get captured and execute the desires of a third party. 
Problems of shirking, drift, and capture manifest in different ways 
for different types of enforcement lawyers.158  Aside from the political 
employees who serve at high levels and are closely connected to the 
goals of the agency, enforcement lawyers can be subdivided into two 
categories: career attorneys seeking a long-term career in the public 
sector and noncareer attorneys who plan to leave for the private sector 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 154 See Salary Table 2013-DCB, U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT. (Jan. 2013), http://www 
.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/2013/general-schedule/dcb.pdf. 
 155 See Catherine Rampell, The Toppling of Top-Tier Lawyer Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2012, 10:00 
AM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/16/the-toppling-of-top-tier-lawyer-jobs (“Across the 
board, big law firms have been offering starting salaries of exactly $160,000 since 2007.”).    
 156 See Jean Tirole, The Internal Organization of Government, 46 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 1, 
6 (1994). 
 157 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Proce-
dures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 247 (1987).   
 158 In addition to the constraints discussed in the main text, lawyers face an additional con-
straint — they have ethical obligations not present for other employees.  The identity of a gov-
ernment lawyer’s client determines whether these constraints are legally binding.  For those who 
see the agency itself as the client, maximizing penalties in accordance with the agency’s wishes is 
generally consistent with a lawyer’s ethical obligations.  In contrast, if government lawyers have 
some independent obligation to serve the public interest, not merely the agency’s wishes, penalties 
might theoretically grow so large as to cross some ethical threshold.  See Steven K. Berenson, 
Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public In-
terest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 794–95 (2000); Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities  
of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1176–78 (2002).  See generally Geoffrey P.  
Miller, Essay, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1293 (1987).  Whether or not these ethical constraints might impose some constraints on en-
forcement lawyers in their penalty determinations in the abstract, there is little evidence that they 
do so in practice.      
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after a short period of time.159  For the careerists, the primary concern 
is that they might shirk, choosing to avoid the hardest cases.  At first 
blush, a preference for easy cases may seem to run counter to an agen-
cy’s incentives to line its coffers or build its reputation with financial 
recoveries.  But, the theory goes, cases seeking large recoveries are 
likely to be more complicated, more time-intensive, and more contro-
versial.  Thus, for enforcement lawyers who do not intend to move on, 
simple cases with small penalties may be more attractive than riskier 
cases with potentially larger rewards.160  
On closer inspection, however, career attorneys’ presumed prefer-
ence for easy cases may not clash with their employers’ goal to recover 
large financial penalties.  As an initial matter, one should not be too 
quick to assume that large penalties always signal particularly difficult 
or controversial cases.  Huge recoveries plainly require cases that are 
“big” in a certain sense, but the difficulty of any given case may have 
more to do with the novelty of the legal theories and the defendant’s 
incentives to fight the requested relief than with the sheer size of the 
monetary award.  As we describe in the next Part, defendants (particu-
larly those with deep pockets) may be all too happy to settle for large 
financial penalties if doing so allows them to put an end to govern-
ment scrutiny and avoid intrusive injunctive remedies.  A large recov-
ery may be fairly easy for a government attorney to win if the gov-
ernment’s legal theory is strong and the sanction represents a drop in 
the bucket of the defendant’s total resources. 
More importantly — and even assuming a perfect correlation be-
tween case stakes and case difficulty — the institutional incentives de-
scribed in the preceding sections do not necessarily require agencies to 
take on big, difficult cases rather than focus on smaller and easier tar-
gets.  We elaborate on this point in Part III, but the intuition is 
straightforward.  Agencies with revolving funds will seek to fill the 
funds up to any statutory caps.  Easy cases may serve that purpose 
just as well as hard ones.  A series of relatively small recoveries can 
yield the same total as one big case, yet demand fewer agency re-
sources and promise a more certain payoff.  Indeed, when the likeli-
hood of success and the costs of litigation are taken into account, the 
expected value of a series of small cases may in fact be higher than the 
value of a standalone blockbuster.161 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 159 Selmi, supra note 22, at 1442. 
 160 See id. at 1444–45 (noting this pressure toward easy cases on career attorneys).  
 161 See Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 305, 
311 (1972) (modeling agency enforcement to show that “under plausible assumptions concerning 
the characteristics of the agency’s cases a perfectly rational, utility-maximizing administrative 
agency will devote a ‘disproportionate’ amount of its resources to relatively minor cases”). 
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Similar points hold for agencies that are concerned primarily with 
building strong enforcement reputations.  A press release or report to 
Congress touting a single record-high recovery may be no more effec-
tive than a report describing record total recoveries.  For example, 
Professor John Coffee has argued that the SEC’s apparent preference 
for small cases, and its concomitant failure to “bring fewer cases [and] 
litigat[e] them more intensively,” can best be explained by two factors: 
The SEC does not want anyone to escape scot-free without any sanction 
(which would be politically embarrassing); and the SEC needs to show 
Congress that it is doing more, bringing more cases and obtaining greater 
aggregate penalties, in order to obtain a larger budget.  Although this poli-
cy does result in larger aggregate sanctions being levied . . . , few may be 
deterred by individually modest penalties.162 
In short, agencies can use high dollar amounts — either in individ-
ual cases or in total — to make their enforcement programs appear ef-
fective to outsiders, even if observers with full information would rec-
ognize that the relevant cases are not particularly difficult or 
significant, or that the financial penalties represent a fraction of the to-
tal harm.  We have argued that monetary awards are easy to quantify 
and to compare to like awards, but it is far more difficult for agency 
outsiders to gauge whether financial payouts are in fact meaningful 
sanctions.  Thus, even if career attorneys in public enforcement agen-
cies have personal incentives to focus on relatively easy cases, those in-
centives may be largely consistent with the financial and reputational 
goals of the agencies as a whole. 
For noncareer attorneys, capture and drift are more likely than 
shirking.  If short-term employees are going to deviate from agency 
goals, it will be to maximize their employability and compensation in 
the private sector after their government service ends.  Here too, the 
effects on financial recoveries are hard to predict.  Lawyers interested 
in enhancing their future employability can pursue a variety of strate-
gies, with very different consequences for the financial bottom line.  
First, employees might seek to curry favor with regulated entities by 
reducing penalties in the hope that lenient treatment now might pro-
duce paybacks in the future.  This approach would obviously under-
mine agency efforts to maximize penalties.  Yet this strategy has obvi-
ous potential drawbacks for the noncareer attorney as well.  The 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 162 John C. Coffee, Jr., Is the SEC’s Bark Worse Than Its Bite?, NAT’L L.J., July 9, 2012, at 10, 
10; see also John C. Coffee Jr., SEC Enforcement: What Has Gone Wrong?, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 3, 
2012, at 23, 23 (“[T]he SEC needs to be able to use objective metrics to justify its request for 
budget increases.  By bringing many actions and settling them cheaply, it can point to an increase 
in the aggregate penalties collected, even if the median penalty is at the same time decreasing.  
This may impress Congress, but from a deterrence perspective, it is similar to issuing modest 
parking tickets for major frauds.”). 
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regulated entity has no incentive to deliver once the lawyer has left the 
public sector, and the corrupt nature of the bargain makes credible, 
binding commitments difficult to arrange in advance.  The firm might 
as well accept the benefit from the employee but later hire the most 
valuable person for the job.163 
As a result, lawyers are more likely to maximize their desirability 
directly.  The impact of these efforts on penalties depends on the form 
the efforts take.  One approach for enforcement lawyers is simply to 
build litigation skills.  Lawyers who have initiated many investiga-
tions, taken multiple depositions, and tried a variety of cases in the 
public sector are more attractive to firms later on.  This effect may 
push enforcement lawyers toward small, easy cases that move fast — 
but that result is not certain.164  After all, cases that are small and easy 
are likely to be resolved early through settlements.  If government at-
torneys wish to build trial experience, they may prefer larger, more dif-
ficult cases with novel legal theories, which are relatively more likely 
to be litigated.165  As a result, the skill-oriented incentives of noncareer 
employees may push penalties either up or down.  On the one hand, if 
they believe future employers want lawyers with experience on the 
largest cases that might go to trial, government attorneys may pursue 
high penalties.  On the other hand, if employers primarily value expe-
rience with depositions and focus less on trial work, noncareerists may 
emphasize smaller cases with lower penalties.  Importantly, either 
strategy may serve the institution’s own self-interest, if recoveries in a 
string of smaller cases yield roughly the same total as those from a few 
big cases. 
Enforcement lawyers have another incentive that may align their 
behavior with the agency incentives we have identified: reputation.  As 
discussed in the previous section, agencies may seek to bolster their in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 163 Yeon-Koo Che, Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion, 26 RAND 
J. ECON. 378, 389 (1995) (“Without a binding assurance, it may not be certain that the firm will, 
ex post, prefer the regulator who exerted the most favor rather than the one most qualified for a 
particular job.”).  For a recent survey of the literature on this issue, see Ernesto Dal Bó, Regulato-
ry Capture: A Review, 22 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y  203, 215 (2006). 
 164 Compare Selmi, supra note 22, at 1445–46 (arguing that noncareer lawyers underlitigate for 
experiential reasons), with Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional 
Responsibility in a Regulatory State, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1995) (arguing that 
agency lawyers overlitigate for the same reasons), and Nicholas S. Zeppos, Department of Justice 
Litigation: Externalizing Costs and Searching for Subsidies, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 
1998, at 171, 173–74 (1998) (arguing that the DOJ uses the promise of litigation experience to 
overcome compensation weaknesses). 
 165 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 1, 4–6 (1984) (providing a general model of cases that settle and cases that are litigat-
ed); Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial Is Possible, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 
493, 493–94 (1996) (explaining that cases are less likely to settle and more likely to go to trial when 
the parties disagree on the likely outcome). 
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stitutional reputations for enforcement effectiveness through large (or 
more precisely, large-sounding) penalties, either in individual cases or 
in the aggregate.  These same pressures, for the same reasons, exist for 
employees as well.  Individual lawyers may seek to develop a public 
reputation for effective enforcement, and emphasizing monetary 
awards is a straightforward way to do so.  Just as agencies focus on fi-
nancial rewards because they are easy to measure and easy to com-
pare,166 individual lawyers may do the same because other measures of 
their competence are difficult to evaluate.167  In other words, agency 
attorneys may believe that the best sort of “winning” record is one that 
begins with a dollar sign and ends with a long series of zeroes.168  A 
reputation for strong enforcement is initially valuable internally, but 
when the lawyer leaves the public sector, it is also useful for attracting 
clients.169 
Finally, there is reason to believe that a strong enforcement pro-
gram will lead to more job creation in private firms that defend 
against the relevant government actions.  In the criminal law context, 
for example, there is evidence that increasing the potential punishment 
for particular types of criminal activity increases the income of the de-
fense bar in that field.  Research shows that the increased use of crim-
inal penalties for white-collar violations since the 1980s may have en-
hanced the demand for former prosecutors to work in defense firms,170 
creating more job opportunities for lawyers with that experience and 
raising their billing rates.  The parallels to the civil enforcement con-
text are obvious.  The more robust the enforcement program, the more 
lucrative the job prospects for former enforcement lawyers.  Here too, 
agency and individual incentives align.  Like the institutions in which 
they work, public employees who anticipate a short stint in the gov-
ernment followed by private-sector employment may have personal in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 166 See supra section II.A.2, pp. 875–86. 
 167 Cf. Tirole, supra note 156, at 4–5. 
 168 Cf. Ed deHaan et al., Does the Revolving Door Affect the SEC’s Enforcement Outcomes? 25–
26 (Am. Accounting Ass’n, 2012 Annual Meeting Paper), available at http://aaahq.org/newsroom 
/RajgopalDeHaanKediaKoh.pdf (finding stronger enforcement efforts against fraudulent financial 
reporting, measured by the fraction of losses collected as damages, the likelihood of criminal pro-
ceedings, and the likelihood of naming the CEO as a defendant, by SEC attorneys who later leave 
to join law firms specializing in the defense of clients charged by the SEC relative to SEC attor-
neys who leave for other ventures). 
 169 A similar point is often made in the context of criminal enforcement.  Prosecutors who have 
a reputation for bringing large cases are likely to find an easier path to a desirable post-
prosecutorial career, whether it is on the bench, in elected office, or as a member of the defense 
bar.  See Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. 
Attorneys, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 379, 396 (2005); Larry E. Ribstein, Agents Prosecuting Agents, 
7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 617, 630–31 (2011).   
 170 See Ribstein, supra note 169, at 631. 
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centives to make the relevant enforcement program appear strong to 
the public and, more importantly, to potential future employers.171 
The discussion in this section has assessed the incentives of agency 
employees generally, without distinguishing among different agencies, 
or between enforcement at the federal and state levels.  There is, of 
course, a great deal of heterogeneity among public enforcers, and teas-
ing out the effects of these various incentives in specific agencies de-
mands a focused and context-specific investigation into the circum-
stances, culture, and norms of each individual organization.172  Our 
goal here is different: rather than seeking to prove that financial incen-
tives are at play in any given public enforcement agency, we offer a 
theory to explain why such incentives are worthy of attention and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 171 As is true of enforcement agencies themselves, the reputational incentives of agency em-
ployees likely vary across agencies and over time.  As the previous section explained, the reputa-
tional pressures on agencies to seek high penalties are greatest at times of high public scrutiny and 
are reduced when the public is not paying attention.  The same results occur for individuals.  An 
individual lawyer’s reputation for aggressive enforcement is more valuable when scrutiny is high 
rather than low.  When agencies are bringing large cases, individual lawyers can benefit more by 
being involved in those cases because the exit options are more valuable.  Additionally, these same 
pressures are likely to change the mix between noncareer and career attorneys in the agency.  
When private sector opportunities are more lucrative, lawyers previously committed to public 
service may have a change of heart.  Public scrutiny thus has a positive relationship with agency 
incentives to regulate: larger penalties become more attractive to both the organization and its 
employees. 
 172 This section has focused solely on formal incentives of public employees.  In addition to  
these pressures, we know that organizational norms and culture play a key role in shaping em-
ployee behavior and can often induce employees to act contrary to their self-interest.  See, e.g., 
Tom R. Tyler, Promoting Employee Policy Adherence and Rule Following in Work Settings: The 
Value of Self-Regulatory Approaches, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1287 (2005).  These general results apply 
to enforcement organizations.  See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Mis-
conduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 453, 493–507 (2004) (describing the effects of organizational cul-
ture on individual behavior in the context of police brutality); Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, 
Criminal Law, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1146–70 (2012).  The 
exact role of an individual agency’s culture and norms in the way enforcers levy financial penal-
ties is context-specific and difficult to predict.  However, we can make two general statements.  
First, incentives matter more when norms are weaker.  See Clemens Kroneberg et al., The Inter-
play of Moral Norms and Instrumental Incentives in Crime Causation, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 259, 
283 (2010) (concluding that individuals who have not internalized moral norms are far more likely 
to consider the instrumental incentives of crime).  As a result, older enforcement programs with 
stronger institutional norms, such as the SEC, are likely to feel the pressures of the incentives de-
scribed in this section less than agencies with newer enforcement powers, such as the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau.  Second, an individual is more likely to comply with norms and 
rules that are consistent with her internal sense of right and wrong.  See TOM R. TYLER, WHY 
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).  There is evidence that individuals emphasize retributive fac-
tors when asked to determine punishment and that, in turn, agencies also emphasize retribution in 
penalty-setting.  Max Minzner, Why Agencies Punish, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 853, 862–63, 903 
(2012).  This evidence would suggest that agencies are likely to be able to induce employees to 
seek financial penalties more easily when punishing the target violation is consistent with retribu-
tive theories.  For example, agencies should be able to achieve large penalties more easily in cases 
involving a scienter requirement than in strict liability cases.  See id. at 888 (describing the im-
portance of the role of mens rea in penalty determinations). 
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more targeted study.  Our theory suggests that, in many cases, the in-
dividuals responsible for public enforcement will share their employ-
ers’ institutional interest in building the agencies’ budget or the agen-
cies’ reputation through financial penalties. 
III.  COSTS AND BENEFITS 
We have sought to show that agencies and their employees have 
self-interested reasons — independent of the public interest in deter-
ring violators and compensating victims — to pursue large monetary 
judgments.  We have called those incentives “financial incentives” for 
ease of exposition, though the previous Part should make clear that the 
motivations differ in important ways from the more direct financial in-
terests of fee-seeking private attorneys.  This Part considers the conse-
quences, positive and negative, of financially motivated public en-
forcement.  The incentives we have described are likely to cause 
agencies to adjust their enforcement practices in several ways.  Finan-
cially motivated agencies are apt to initiate more enforcement actions, 
reduce their focus on nonmonetary remedies, and compete with one 
another for enforcement dollars. 
Depending on other aspects of the enforcement calculus, financial 
incentives can either improve or weaken the functioning of public en-
forcement.  For example, in cases where we expect that agencies are 
doing far too little enforcement across the board, financial incentives 
may produce welcome agency action.  In cases where agencies are do-
ing too much — and particularly where they already tend to overem-
phasize monetary recoveries — financial incentives can exacerbate 
problems that already exist.  However, we can make more confident 
assessments when it comes to making a selection between public and 
private enforcers: The presence of financial incentives pushes public 
enforcement in the same direction as private enforcement.  Both are 
likely to seek out the same types of targets and emphasize the same 
types of cases.  As a result, when agencies face financial incentives, 
many of the perceived weaknesses of private enforcement compared to 
public enforcement are reduced. 
A.  How Financial Incentives Affect Public Enforcement 
1.  More Enforcement. — The most obvious consequence of creat-
ing financial motivations is that they — like any other motivation — 
may spur action.  Agencies and other public enforcers may find them-
selves more interested in starting investigations and undertaking  
enforcement if they have a financial stake in the outcome.  The possi-
bility of a financial or reputational payoff increases the expected bene-
fits of enforcement, thereby tilting the scales in favor of action and 
against inaction. 
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This straightforward point has clear parallels to the literature on 
private enforcement.  It has long been assumed that private litigants 
and their attorneys will initiate enforcement actions if (and only if) the 
expected benefits outweigh the expected costs.173  For private enforc-
ers, the benefits of enforcement typically are private benefits: damages 
and/or injunctive relief that will benefit the plaintiff(s) personally.174  
The same is true for private attorneys, most of whom will take a case 
only if the expected hourly or contingent fee exceeds the opportunity 
costs of foregoing other work.175  It follows that raising the expected 
financial benefits of enforcement should — and apparently does — in-
crease the number of private enforcement actions.176  For example, in 
the 1991 amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,177 
Congress increased the monetary damages available to plaintiffs in 
employment discrimination suits.178  Multiple studies have shown that 
private Title VII litigation in federal court increased sharply, nearly 
tripling in frequency, following the 1991 amendments.179  Similar 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 173 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alterna-
tive Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 58 (1982) (“[U]nder the 
American system, the plaintiff will bring suit if and only if his expected judgment would be at 
least as large as his legal costs.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 174 Shavell, supra note 28, at 578.  Note that advocacy groups complicate this picture.  Groups 
like the American Civil Liberties Union frequently initiate litigation in order to benefit specific 
sectors of society or to effect social change.  In such litigation, these groups can be seen as pursu-
ing a mix of private and public benefits.  See generally Howard M. Erichson, Doing Good, Doing 
Well, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2087 (2004) (describing public interest lawyering). 
 175 Public interest lawyers face slightly different incentives since they may be willing to bear 
net private costs to obtain public benefits.  However, financial recoveries often still matter for 
counsel seeking structural reform, and private benefits can provoke public interest litigation.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (providing for attorneys’ fees in certain civil rights actions). 
 176 See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 782, 796–805 (2011) 
(discussing theoretical and empirical literatures on the effects of damage enhancements on the rate 
of private enforcement). 
 177 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 178 See id. § 1981a(b)(3). 
 179 See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, General Essay, Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 116 (2009) (re-
porting, based on data provided by the Administrative Office of the Federal Courts (AO), that 
“employment discrimination cases exploded from 8303 cases terminated in 1991 to 23,722 cases 
terminated in 1998, a 286% increase,” and attributing the change to, among other factors, the in-
crease in available damages); Sean Farhang, Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: Evi-
dence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (2009) (finding a 
dramatic rise in the number of Title VII claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission after 1991); Selmi, supra note 22, at 1435–36 (studying the AO data and reporting 
that employment discrimination litigation more than doubled between 1991 and 1994); Laura 
Beth Nielsen et al., Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the 
Contemporary United States 13–14, 41 fig.1 (Am. Bar Found. Research Paper Series, No. 08-04, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093313 (studying files from a random sample of 2100 
employment discrimination cases and finding that employment discrimination litigation nearly 
tripled between 1992 and 1997, and that the increase was due in part to increased filings by Title 
VII claimants); see also Sean Farhang & Douglas M. Spencer, Economic Incentives for Attorney 
 
  
2014] FOR-PROFIT PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT 897 
spikes in private enforcement have occurred following the passage of 
other statutes that have been amended to increase the private benefits 
of bringing suit.180 
The cost-benefit calculus is more complicated in the public sphere, 
because agencies and other public enforcers are expected to take into 
account the public benefits of enforcement, including the deterrent 
value of a successful action.181  Public enforcers also should consider 
the broader costs of enforcement, including the burdens on the court 
system and the defendant(s) as well as their own time and expense.182  
The relative breadth of the public enforcer’s cost-benefit calculus is 
one of the key features thought to distinguish public from private en-
forcement.  For example, commentators critical of private enforcement 
argue that, unlike their private counterparts, public enforcers can be 
expected to forego enforcement actions that promise large financial 
rewards but little deterrent payoff or that impose high systemic 
costs.183  Other commentators, more pessimistic about the promise of 
public enforcement, worry that agencies will fail to internalize the full 
public benefits of rigorous enforcement and thus may forego promising 
enforcement opportunities that avaricious private litigants and lawyers 
would pursue.184 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Representation in Civil Rights Litigation 37–38 (Jan. 30, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1882245 (reporting that the 1991 
amendments substantially increased the probability that Title VII plaintiffs would be represented 
by counsel). 
 180 For example, in 1988, Congress amended the Fair Housing Act to remove an existing cap on 
punitive damages.  See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 813(c), 102 
Stat. 1619, 1633–34 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c) (2006)).  The rate of private litigation under 
the Act increased mildly by 1990, and by 1996 had increased by “nearly 200% over the 1990 level 
of activity.”  Selmi, supra note 22, at 1419; see also id. at 1418–19.  The False Claims Act offers 
another example.  The Act contains a qui tam provision that permits a private citizen with evi-
dence of fraud against the United States to bring a civil action against the wrongdoer on behalf of 
the government.  In 1986, Congress amended the False Claims Act to make it easier, and signifi-
cantly more lucrative, for private citizens to sue.  Not surprisingly, the number of qui tam cases 
received by the DOJ shot up after the 1986 amendments.  See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 48 (2002)  (reporting that, while the DOJ received approximately six qui tam 
cases each year prior to 1986, 3326 actions were filed between the effective date of the 1986 
amendments and October 30, 2000); Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and 
the Public Interest: An Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 955 (2007) (reporting that 
4704 qui tam cases were filed between 1986 and 2004, resulting in $8.4 billion in recovery for the 
government). 
 181 See Rose, supra note 18, at 1329 (discussing how the public enforcer can adjust its enforce-
ment scheme in order to achieve optimal levels of deterrence). 
 182 Dam, supra note 18, at 67; Lemos, supra note 41, at 705. 
 183 See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A 
Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2201–03 (2010). 
 184 See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 22, at 1443 (“Attorneys who have no particular stake in the out-
come and who are not dependent on their reputation to attract future clients are less likely to 
spend time bargaining to extract the maximum amount from the defendant, unless the attorneys 
are truly motivated by a passion for civil rights.”).  
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The reality of financially motivated public enforcement complicates 
this distinction between public and private enforcement.  When an 
agency is permitted to retain all or part of the proceeds of enforcement, 
it has an interest — a “private” interest, so to speak — in the outcome 
of the case.  Even if the agency carefully considers the public interest 
in the enforcement and continues to weigh all the costs, the conclusion 
of its cost-benefit analysis may be different given the new interest on 
the scale.  Importantly, the difference will always run in the same di-
rection: in favor of action.  Revolving funds and other institutional ar-
rangements that allow agencies to share directly in the spoils of en-
forcement increase the benefits of enforcement from the agency’s 
perspective while leaving the costs unchanged.  All else equal, there-
fore, we should expect to see more enforcement from agencies and 
state attorneys general who “eat what [they] kill.”185  
As discussed in the previous Part, even where agencies must turn 
over their “winnings” to the state or federal treasury, they may have 
reputational incentives to maximize dollar amounts.  Just as private 
attorneys may count the reputational payoffs of successful lawsuits 
among the expected benefits, agencies may factor the reputational 
boost of big recoveries into their own cost-benefit analyses.  Such repu-
tational interests are unlikely to weigh as heavily in the overall calcu-
lus as the more direct financial incentives created by revolving funds, 
but the marginal effect is the same: to increase the perceived benefits 
of action relative to inaction. 
2.  Selection of Remedies. — Financial incentives also affect the 
remedies that agencies seek.  Enforcement actions can result in a mix 
of financial penalties and injunctive relief, and the optimal mix is case-
dependent.  All else equal, financial incentives are likely to shift the 
focus of enforcement actions toward monetary penalties and away 
from other types of relief. 
In this tradeoff, public enforcers again look like private enforcers.  
Private attorneys — including class action counsel — face incentives to 
emphasize financial rewards over equitable remedies whenever they 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 185 BRANN, supra note 60, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).  We are not aware of any 
empirical studies testing the effects of revolving funds and the like on public enforcers’ decisions 
to initiate actions to enforce state and/or federal law.  In the asset-forfeiture context, however, the 
available evidence is consistent with the intuition that agencies will be more eager to engage in 
enforcement that has the potential to line their coffers.  See supra notes 74–77 and accompanying 
text (discussing rise in asset forfeitures following amendments to federal law that permitted the 
relevant enforcement agencies to retain the assets).  For an interesting study of the contrast be-
tween public enforcement and financially motivated private enforcement, see Eric Helland &  
Alexander Tabarrok, The Fugitive: Evidence on Public Versus Private Law Enforcement from 
Bail Jumping, 47 J.L. & ECON. 93 (2004) (comparing efforts of police and private bail bondsmen 
to find felons who jump bail and bring them to trial, and finding “strong evidence that bounty 
hunters are highly effective at recapturing defendants who attempt to flee justice — considerably 
more so than the public police,” id. at 109). 
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are compensated with a fraction of the judgment or settlement fund 
rather than on an hourly rate or flat fee.186  The larger the financial 
recovery, the larger the attorney’s fee.  The interests of the plaintiff’s 
bar are aligned with the interests of defendants in this respect.  In 
many cases, defendants would rather pay a bigger penalty than suffer 
an injunction that “will end their ability to continue the lucrative but 
unlawful practice”187 or otherwise upset their business model.  Counsel 
can therefore trade the removal of the threat of injunctive relief for a 
higher damages award and a commensurate increase in fees.188 
In agencies where financial incentives are present, we should ex-
pect to see the same patterns.  Public enforcers may emphasize mone-
tary penalties while reducing their reliance on injunctive relief.  For 
their part, defendants in government actions — as in private suits — 
may prefer to pay financial awards if the alternative is to engage in 
lengthy remediation or submit to other forms of injunctive relief.  
Even hefty financial penalties may amount to a proverbial slap on the 
wrist for well-heeled defendants.189 
Financial penalties also have the advantage of certainty and clo-
sure.  Remediation efforts and injunctive relief can extend long into 
the future and the eventual cost is often unclear at the outset.  More-
over, injunctive remedies can be intrusive, changing the way the de-
fendant does business or organizes itself.  Such changes may have sig-
nificant effects on the defendant’s behavior going forward — and  
defendants may be keen to avoid them for precisely that reason. 
An example of this transition from injunctive to financial remedies 
has occurred in the wetlands remediation context.190  State and federal 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 186 See Frances Kahn Zemans, Fee Shifting and the Implementation of Public Policy, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1984, at 187, 188 (1984) (“[U]nlike large monetary claims that may be 
pursued on a contingency fee basis, suits seeking equitable relief of even a very serious nature are 
inhibited by the anticipated high legal fees.”). 
 187 Gilles & Friedman, supra note 31, at 161.   
 188 See id. at 160–61 (“[P]laintiffs may sue for injunctive relief and damages and then collude 
with the defendant to settle the case for damages only.  In many cases, defendants will pay dearly 
for this privilege because the injunction is what concerns them most . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
 189 This criticism has been directed recently even at agencies imposing some of the largest pen-
alty amounts.  See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Making Them Pay (and Confess), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
27, 2013, at BU1 (criticizing SEC enforcement practices); Kate Sheppard, Is the BP Criminal Set-
tlement Enough?, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 15, 2012, 12:55 PM), www.motherjones.com/blue 
-marble/2012/11/bp-criminal-settlement-enough (reporting critiques by Public Citizen of the $4.5 
billion settlement with BP over the Deepwater Horizon spill based on the government’s unwill-
ingness to pursue nonmonetary penalties such as barring the company from obtaining government 
contracts); see also Lemos, supra note 39, at 526 (discussing complaints that the February 2012 
$25 billion multistate mortgage settlement with the federal government amounts to a slap on the 
wrist given the scope of the wrongdoing and the resulting harm).      
 190 See generally Royal C. Gardner, Money for Nothing? The Rise of Wetland Fee Mitigation, 
19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2000) (discussing the growth of fee mitigation in the wetlands-preservation 
context and its associated problems). 
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environmental agencies regulate development projects that affect wet-
lands.  When developers seek approval for projects that degrade wet-
lands, they commonly have been required to mitigate the effects of 
their projects by restoring, preserving, or otherwise benefiting wet-
lands elsewhere.191  This obligation is effectively injunctive in nature; 
developers need to engage in specific mitigation tasks to satisfy their 
obligation and earn the right to continue development.  However, en-
vironmental agencies have begun to accept financial payments in lieu 
of mitigation efforts.  In these fee mitigation schemes, developers pay a 
fixed sum to the regulatory agency and are relieved of the obligation to 
mitigate.  The payments may (or may not) end up being devoted to 
wetland protection.192 
The fact that regulated entities may be only too happy to pay hefty 
penalties to buy their freedom from government oversight likely 
strengthens enforcers’ own incentives to emphasize financial recoveries 
over injunctive remedies.  Agreeing to financial penalties may facilitate 
settlement, allowing agencies to minimize the costs of enforcement 
while maximizing the immediate benefits to the agency itself.  This ef-
fect is likely to be strongest where public enforcers are permitted to  
retain a portion of any financial recovery, but it should extend to situa-
tions where enforcers have reputational incentives to emphasize meas-
urable variables (like dollar amounts) over more subtle and speculative 
policy improvements from prospective relief.193 
Indeed, in some cases financial incentives may not only affect 
agencies’ preferences among enforcement options, but may push public 
enforcers to favor enforcement as such over other regulatory alterna-
tives.  Agencies often (though not always) have a range of regulatory 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 191 See id. at 1.  For a general introduction to the wetlands compensatory mitigation program, 
see Compensatory Mitigation, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov 
/lawsregs/guidance/wetlands/wetlandsmitigation_index.cfm (last updated Sept. 11, 2013).  
 192 See Gardner, supra note 190, at 4. 
 193 A related set of incentives contributed to the creation of the much-publicized SEC practice 
of allowing the targets of enforcement to settle without admitting responsibility.  See generally 
Samuel W. Buell, Liability and Admissions of Wrongdoing in Public Enforcement of Law, 82 U. 
CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship 
/2856 (describing and criticizing this SEC practice).  The express purpose of this practice was to 
induce fast settlements and avoid lengthy trials on the theory that the potential exposure in sub-
sequent private civil actions from an admission of liability at the SEC enforcement stage would 
be too great for the defendant to risk.  See Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial 
Regulators: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 79 (2012) (statement of 
Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) 
(“The reality is that many companies likely would refuse to settle cases if they were required to 
affirmatively admit unlawful conduct or facts related to that conduct.  This is because such ad-
missions would not only expose them to additional lawsuits by private litigants seeking damages, 
but would also risk a ‘collateral estoppel’ effect in such lawsuits.”).  Both trials and admissions of 
wrongdoing have value to the public, however, and the SEC policy reflected a choice to minimize 
those values in favor of other agency goals.  See Buell, supra (manuscript at 10, 14).       
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options that work to stop violations before they can occur.  They can 
deny entities the right to enter an industry in the first place or order 
them to shut down activities when appropriate.194  In some cases, 
agencies may be able to choose between devoting resources either to ex 
ante investigation and prevention, or to ex post enforcement and sanc-
tion.195  Agencies focused on financial recoveries may, on balance, 
downplay preventative remedies and focus more on remunerative 
sanctions.  More broadly, agencies that derive significant funding from 
enforcement may focus on enforcement at the expense of other tasks, 
such as developing new regulations. 
Unlike the other consequences we discuss in this section, this pref-
erence for ex post sanctions over ex ante prevention does not have an 
obvious parallel in the private sphere.  Because private enforcement 
tends overwhelmingly to be victim driven, it contains a built-in correc-
tive to the temptation to allow harm to occur so that enforcement may 
follow.  In such cases, in order to reap the financial rewards of en-
forcement, the putative plaintiff would have to permit violations of 
law to be inflicted on her — that is, she would have to permit herself 
to be harmed, or the harm to be prolonged, in order to maximize the 
recovery.196  In the public sphere, by contrast, the harm in question 
will not befall the enforcing agency, but the public at large.  Financial 
incentives therefore drive a wedge between the agency’s interest in 
maximizing recoveries and the public’s interest in minimizing harm. 
3.  Competition. — Finally, financial motivations can lead to com-
petition for dollars among would-be enforcers.  If agencies seek to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 194 For example, the SEC requires a range of licenses and registration in order to participate in 
a variety of activities in the securities industry.  Revoking these licenses and barring enforcement 
targets from working in the industry is one of the enforcement tools available to the agency.  See, 
e.g., Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 94 (1981) (a case arising from the SEC’s decision to bar a mu-
tual fund manager from associating with investment advisers or companies).  Similarly, the Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission (NRC) authorizes the opening of power plants and has the authority 
to shut them down in cases of safety concerns.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2232, 2236 (2006) (authorizing 
the NRC to grant and revoke licenses).  Similarly, licenses are required for many individual em-
ployees at power plants and the NRC can revoke those as well.  See 10 C.F.R. § 55.3 (2013) (man-
dating operator licenses); id. § 55.61 (revocation of operator licenses).    
 195 Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 24, at 26 (raising concerns that private enforcers who are 
paid per offender convicted would have incentives to wait until crimes were committed rather 
than apprehend offenders at the attempt stage, “since the penalty for the completed crime will 
presumably be heavier than the penalty for the attempt”).  For a discussion of the tradeoffs be-
tween ex ante prevention and ex post sanction, see generally Steven Shavell, The Optimal Struc-
ture of Law Enforcement, 36 J.L. & ECON. 255, 257–58, 261–65 (1993). 
 196 In some circumstances such behavior may well be rational, and we have doctrines to ad-
dress those cases, like the doctrine that the victims of contract breach must mitigate their damag-
es.  But cf. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Essay, The Distortionary Effect of Evidence on 
Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 519–21 (2010) (arguing that the need to collect evi-
dence encourages enforcers of all types to let harm continue so that they can substantiate their 
claims, a situation that cannot be easily addressed by adopting any particular legal doctrine). 
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maximize their recoveries, a viable strategy is to poach lucrative en-
forcement opportunities from other agencies with overlapping jurisdic-
tion.  Interenforcer competition is likely to be particularly intractable 
when it is zero-sum, given defendants’ limited resources and re-
strictions on duplicative recoveries.197 
These conflicts can occur between agencies whose jurisdictions 
overlap either horizontally or vertically.  At the federal level, for ex-
ample, the CFTC and the SEC famously have had horizontal jurisdic-
tional conflicts on a range of topics.198  However, competition and turf 
battles are not limited to the financial sector and occur across federal 
regulatory agencies.199  Vertical competition occurs when federal and 
state regulators chase the same enforcement targets.  Under then–
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, for example, the New York Attorney 
General’s Office frequently pursued enforcement actions falling within 
the jurisdiction of federal regulators.200  Following the 2008 financial 
crisis, other state attorneys general aggressively pursued actions related 
to mortgage fraud in tandem with federal regulators.201 
Financial incentives might also increase the potential for competi-
tion and conflict between public and private enforcers.  As public en-
forcers have taken on responsibility for compensating victims of state 
and federal law violations, they have begun to fill roles traditionally 
served by private counsel and by class actions.  It is not uncommon for 
state attorneys general, for example, to pursue large-scale representa-
tive actions that bear striking resemblances to damages class ac-
tions.202  One consequence is increasing competition between state and 
private counsel over who will represent the relevant groups of injured 
citizens.  Public enforcers enjoy an edge in those battles, because some 
courts tend to presume that government attorneys will better represent 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 197 Financial penalties are often, but not always, zero-sum in nature.  Non–zero sum enforce-
ment is particularly common where agencies have different (and exclusive) remedies available to 
them.  For example, the DOJ has a monopoly on criminal penalties: agencies can refer cases to the 
DOJ but cannot independently seek to incarcerate a defendant or impose criminal fines.  Neal 
Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 
5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558, 561–62 (2003). 
 198 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Competition Versus Consolidation: The Significance of Organiza-
tional Structure in Financial and Securities Regulation, 50 BUS. LAW. 447, 460–61 (1995);  
Edward J. Kane, Regulatory Structure in Futures Markets: Jurisdictional Competition Between 
the SEC, the CFTC, and Other Agencies, 4 J. FUTURES MKTS. 367, 375–76 (1984).  
 199 See, e.g., Timothy M. Hammonds, It Is Time to Designate a Single Food Safety Agency, 59 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 427, 430 (2004) (discussing competition for authority and budget allocations 
among the federal agencies with jurisdiction over food safety); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Cli-
mate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the Administrative State: A Guide for Whit-
tling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 70 (2010). 
 200 See Lemos, supra note 41, at 725–27 (discussing actions by Attorney General Spitzer within 
the jurisdiction of the SEC). 
 201 See LEHMAN, supra note 5. 
 202 See Lemos, supra note 39, at 492–500. 
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the interests of their states’ citizens — in part because they believe that 
those attorneys lack any direct financial interest in the case.203 
Once again, the notion that financially motivated enforcers will 
compete for dollars has obvious parallels to commentary on private en-
forcement.  Private counsel naturally struggle to represent plaintiffs 
with lucrative claims.  That basic insight is captured in the image of 
the so-called “ambulance chaser,” who rushes to a victim’s bedside so 
that he can beat out other attorneys.  Though the imagery is less vivid, 
interattorney competition is perhaps most stark in the context of class 
actions, as would-be class counsel compete for the honor of represent-
ing the class and collecting a portion of the winnings.  Public enforcers 
may have nonfinancial reasons for competition, such as a desire to in-
crease the relative clout of their institutions.  But as in the private 
sphere, financial incentives are likely to enhance those incentives. 
B.  Assessing the Incentives: Is For-Profit  
Public Enforcement Desirable? 
We have argued that, on balance, financially motivated public en-
forcement means more public enforcement; that such enforcement will 
tend to focus on maximizing financial recoveries rather than securing 
injunctive relief and, thus, often will target deep-pocketed defendants; 
and that financial incentives may induce agencies into competition 
with other potential enforcers, both public and private.  The question 
remains whether these effects are positive or negative.  It is impossible 
to answer that question in the abstract, and — we suggest — a mis-
take to try.  Whether financially motivated public enforcement is 
something to be celebrated or mourned depends on one’s view of the 
optimal level of public enforcement, as well as an appraisal of the like-
ly performance of the relevant agency with and without financial in-
centives.  Moreover, the answer surely will differ across agencies, given 
different statutory contexts, institutional structures, resources, person-
nel, cultures, and so on.  We have sought to show that financial incen-
tives bring public enforcement closer to the private-enforcement model 
than is commonly appreciated.  Just as one’s view of the propriety of 
private enforcement depends on a mix of subjective policy judgment 
and context-specific empirical fact, so too must one’s assessment of 
whether financial incentives are a feature or a bug in the public 
sphere. 
The important point for present purposes is that the financial in-
centives described in Part II are in no sense inevitable or invariable.  
Instead, they are properly understood as tools with which policymak-
ers can calibrate the desired intensity of enforcement.  This point is 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 203 See id. at 506–07. 
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well understood in the context of private enforcement.  For example, 
Congress frequently uses financial incentives to encourage private en-
forcement in areas where there is reason to believe that enforcement 
levels will be suboptimal.  An empirical study revealed approximately 
one hundred federal statutes that promise putative plaintiffs damages 
beyond their actual losses, either in the form of a multiplier (for exam-
ple, double or treble damages) or punitive damages.204  The obvious 
purpose of such provisions is to harness the financial incentives of pri-
vate litigants in service of the enforcement of federal law.205 
Despite policymakers’ strategic manipulation of private enforcers’ 
financial incentives, the same strategies have been overlooked in the 
public sphere — perhaps on the view that the very notion of financial-
ly motivated public enforcement is oxymoronic.  Congress does some-
times ratchet up federal agencies’ enforcement tools, authorizing them 
to collect ever-larger amounts in civil penalties.206  Yet those changes 
tend to be made without meaningful attention to the agencies’ incen-
tives to use the new powers in an effective way. 
Consider, in this regard, the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC), which is tasked with protecting the public from hazardous 
consumer products through safety standards, product recalls, regula-
tion, and enforcement.207  As one commentator has observed, the his-
tory of the CPSC has been one of “massive regulatory failure.”208  By 
2007, limited resources, industry capture, and vacant Commission 
seats had left the CPSC “an agency in distress.”209  Recalls fell in 
number and were slow and incomplete when they happened.210  “Fines 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 204 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 66 (2010); see also Lemos, supra note 176, 
at 791–92 (describing damages enhancements in multiple federal statutes). 
 205 See Lemos, supra note 176, at 793–95 (discussing legislative histories of suit-boosting  
statutes). 
 206 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 105, 116 Stat. 745, 759–64 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7215 (2012)) (giving the SEC new authority to impose substantial civil 
penalties for violations by public accounting firms); Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job 
Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, § 2, 125 Stat. 1904, 1905–06 (2012) (codified in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.) (amending 49 U.S.C. § 60122 (2006 & Supp. V 2011), and doubling the max-
imum civil penalty the PHMSA can impose from $100,000 to $200,000 per day per violation). 
 207 See Who We Are — What We Do for You, U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMIS-
SION, http://www.cpsc.gov/Safety-Education/Safety-Guides/General-Information/Who-We-Are---What 
-We-Do-for-You (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
 208 Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative Law Through a Revitali-
zation of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product Safety and Improve-
ment Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 184 (2010). 
 209 Oversight of the Consumer Product Safety Commission: Product Safety in the Holiday Sea-
son: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot., Prod. Safety, & Ins. of the S. Comm. on 
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 111th Cong. 2 (2010) (statement of Sen. Mark Pryor, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Consumer Protection, Product Safety, and Insurance). 
 210 See Widman, supra note 208, at 181–83 (discussing inadequate recalls of deadly cribs and 
other child-safety devices); see also KIDS IN DANGER, TOXIC TOYS AND FAULTY CRIBS: AN 
EXAMINATION OF CHILDREN’S PRODUCT RECALLS IN 2008, RECALL EFFECTIVENESS AT 
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were virtually nonexistent, even for companies with repeated re-
calls.”211  Congress intervened with the Consumer Product Safety Im-
provement Act of 2008212 (CPSIA), which sought to improve the 
CPSC’s performance in various ways, including by strengthening en-
forcement.  Among other changes, the Act raised the amounts the 
CPSC could recover in civil penalties from $5000 to $100,000 per vio-
lation, and raised the maximum penalties per violator from $1.25  
million to $15 million.213  Civil penalties spiked in the wake of the  
CPSIA — jumping from $3.675 million in 2008214 to $9.8 million in 
2009215 — but then leveled off at an average of $4.938 million over the 
next three years.216  Given that maximum penalties increased nearly 
fifteen-fold under the CPSIA, the fact that annual penalties have not 
even regularly doubled suggests that the agency is not using its ex-
panded authority as aggressively as it might. 
Would a financially motivated CPSC mean stronger enforcement?  
We recognize, of course, that beefing up public enforcement is not an 
uncontroversial goal.  If (as many believe) the CPSC’s mission is fun-
damentally misguided, then the less the agency does, the better.  Nev-
ertheless, for purposes of discussion we assume that public enforce-
ment of federal consumer protection law is desirable, at least up to a 
certain level, and that current enforcement remains well below that 
level.  The interesting question, in our view, is whether financial incen-
tives might provide an institutional counterweight to existing disincen-
tives to action.  We argue that the answer is a qualified yes.  The qual-
ifications are important, however, and highlight the potential pitfalls of 
engineering public enforcement in a way that emphasizes financial  
incentives. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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Although the specific causes of the CPSC’s lackluster enforcement 
are not clear, commentators have identified various factors that may 
produce suboptimal levels of public enforcement generally.  For exam-
ple, Professor Michael Selmi has compared public and private en-
forcement of federal civil rights law and has found that public enforc-
ers pursue smaller cases and recover lower awards than the private 
bar.217  The relevant agencies litigate primarily on behalf of private 
claimants, so any money they recover goes to the victims of discrimi-
nation.  As Selmi observes, the agencies’ own lack of financial incen-
tives helps explain their lackluster enforcement.218  That problem may 
be intractable in agencies that represent private interests, but the 
CPSC is different: like most public enforcers, it has authority to seek 
civil penalties to protect the public interest in law compliance.219  
It would be possible, therefore, for Congress to tweak the institu-
tional structure in order to increase the CPSC’s own incentive for ac-
tion.220  For example, Congress could create a revolving fund, similar 
to the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account described in 
Part II, which would be funded by the proceeds of enforcement and 
used to support further enforcement-related activity.  The effect of 
such a fund would depend on agency leadership — on the extent to 
which agency heads encourage attorneys to prioritize gains for the 
fund and reward those who produce the largest gains.  But, as we ar-
gued in the previous Part, agency leadership typically will have ample 
incentives to maximize any dedicated funding source.  Thus, one might 
expect that the CPSC would ramp up enforcement efforts, going after 
bigger winnings, if the agency itself could benefit from the proceeds. 
A revolving fund also could address another recurring cause  
of agency underenforcement: lack of resources.  Rather than depend-
ing on legislative largesse on an annual basis, an agency with an  
enforcement-funded revolving fund can — depending on how the fund 
is structured — essentially support itself.221  Moreover, a dedicated 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 217 See Selmi, supra note 22, at 1404. 
 218 See id. at 1443.  
 219 15 U.S.C. § 2069 (2012) (authorizing the CPSC to impose civil penalties). 
 220 Whether current or future members of Congress would want to do so is a different question, 
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funding source may work to expand the agency’s budget over time, by 
persuading legislators that the agency is a good investment, or simply 
by shifting the burden of legislative inertia to favor the agency.222 
Whether financial incentives would induce an agency like the 
CPSC to focus on the most important cases — those that pack the big-
gest deterrent punch — is a more difficult question.  Money is, at best, 
an imperfect proxy for importance.  To be sure, more damages imply 
more harm, and thus more serious (or at least widespread) wrongdo-
ing.  But the relative question is critical: more than what?  Given 
asymmetric information, it is difficult for outsiders to gauge whether 
public enforcers are going after the right cases, and even harder to de-
termine whether agencies are eking out meaningful penalties from the 
targets they choose.  Agencies have far more information about poten-
tial enforcement targets than do their overseers in the political branch-
es and the general public, including potential future employers of 
agency attorneys.  To the extent that agencies prefer relatively easy 
targets over difficult ones, they may be tempted to use high-value 
monetary recoveries to make unimportant cases seem important to 
those who lack full information — or to string together a series of 
modest recoveries to create an impressive-sounding total.  Even where 
agencies do pursue big targets, they may agree to awards that sound 
large to the uninitiated but that represent a drop in the bucket of the 
defendant’s overall resources.223  Indeed, we have suggested that one 
of the reputational advantages of large financial recoveries is that big 
recoveries sound good, even if they amount to little more than a slap 
on the wrist or address a problem of marginal importance.  That repu-
tational benefit inures only to the agency, however; from the public’s 
perspective, it can be a cost. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
tivities under this chapter.”); and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-19 (West 2012) (providing that the attor-
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 222 See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
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The more direct financial incentives created by revolving funds 
might work better to align the agency’s interest with the public’s inter-
est in well-targeted enforcement efforts.  Revolving funds can mitigate 
the tendency to favor easy resolutions by giving the agency a direct, 
self-interested reason to maximize recoveries.  If the agency chooses to 
dole out a slap on the wrist, or to pursue small problems over big ones, 
the agency itself will lose out. 
But here too the fix is far from perfect.  First, as commentators 
have argued in the context of private enforcement, attorneys must 
weigh the possible benefits of each suit or decision to settle against the 
associated costs.224  Such costs include both direct costs and the oppor-
tunity costs of other suits foregone.  The same is true of public enforc-
ers.  If they hope to line their coffers, agencies may do better going af-
ter a series of quick wins rather than sinking vast resources into 
netting the one big fish.  Bigger fish, after all, may be harder to catch.  
Larger and better-funded defendants may be better able to fight a 
government action, and important cases are often complicated and 
unwieldy.  If the big case is harder to win, its expected benefits may  
be lower — and its costs higher — than those of a series of small,  
easy cases. 
Second, even where public enforcers are permitted to eat what they 
kill, few (if any) revolving funds take the form of an “all you can eat” 
buffet.  Instead, such funds are capped, either by reference to the 
agency’s overall budget, or by a fixed dollar amount.  For example, the 
revolving fund created by HIPAA specifies the amount each of the rel-
evant agencies can draw from the fund each year.225  On their face, 
those limits operate as caps on outputs of the agencies.  In practice, 
they may also function as effective caps on inputs, because agencies 
have relatively weak incentives to go after judgments they will not be 
permitted to keep.  Yet even a capped revolving fund could provide a 
helpful impetus for an agency like the CPSC, which currently collects 
so little in enforcement.  In 2012, for example, the CPSC reported to 
Congress that it had obtained “$7.654 million in civil penalties through 
out-of-court settlements.”226  That same year, it requested a budget of 
$122.425 million — suggesting that there is ample room for enforce-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 224 See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust 
and Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1042 (2002) (“The self-interested 
attorney seeks to maximize the return on her involvement in the litigation while minimizing the 
resources expended.”). 
 225 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
 226 U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, 2012 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY REPORT, supra note 216, at 6. 
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ment to support the agency’s function without swelling its budget well 
beyond current levels.227 
It might be tempting to suppose that interenforcer competition 
would provide an additional remedy to public underenforcement.  As 
we explained in the previous section, agencies that derive significant 
funding from enforcement may have incentives to poach lucrative en-
forcement opportunities from other would-be enforcers.  One might 
dismiss such competition as wasteful, but it might in some circum-
stances be beneficial for all the reasons that competition is preferable 
to monopoly.228  If ineffective enforcers lose out to more efficient and 
effective ones, perhaps competition will push underperforming agen-
cies to improve their practices. 
Again, however, there are significant problems.  First, in some in-
stances of competition, one side holds a trump card.  For example, al-
though federal law often authorizes enforcement by both state and 
federal actors, it expresses a clear preference in favor of federal en-
forcement.  Typically, state enforcers must “notify the relevant federal 
agency in advance of filing a complaint,” must permit the federal en-
forcer to intervene in the case, and cannot pursue violations that al-
ready are the subject of a pending federal enforcement action.229  As 
noted in the previous section, state attorneys general also might com-
pete with private litigants — and particularly private class actions — 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 227 U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET REQUEST 1 
(2012).  The SEC provides a useful counterpoint.  The SEC is routinely criticized for favoring 
wrist slaps over deterrent punches.  See, e.g., Morgenson, supra note 189 (arguing that frequent 
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  This problem is significant, but not intractable.  First, it is worth noting that one possible 
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to collect judgments.  See supra note 185 and accompanying text.  Second, it would be possible to 
structure a fund such that the SEC would benefit even from recoveries far above its projected 
budget.  After all, there is no theoretical bar to an entirely uncapped fund.  More realistically, a 
fund could be structured such that the SEC would be permitted to retain a certain percentage of 
recoveries — say, ten percent — or to retain all recoveries over a certain threshold — say, $1.5 
billion.  Neither formulation is terribly complicated, and both would give the SEC a financial in-
centive to collect as much money as possible.  
 228 Cf. Lemos, supra note 41, at 748–49 (describing benefits of state-federal competition in en-
forcement of federal law). 
 229 Id. at 708 (describing statutory limitations on state enforcement of federal law). 
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for representation of the state’s citizens.  Here states hold the ad-
vantage, as courts tend to conclude that representative litigation by 
state attorneys general represents a “superior” mode of adjudicating 
aggregate claims and to deny class certification on that basis.230  In 
both instances, the competition is resolved by fiat rather than by per-
formance, leaving little reason to believe that the winner of the battle 
(federal enforcers in the first instance, states in the second) would have 
imposed more effective sanctions than the loser. 
In other instances, interenforcer competition is resolved in a way 
that seems designed to reward weak enforcers over strong ones.  This 
problem is familiar in class actions, where private attorneys compete 
with one another to be first to reach a settlement with the defendant, 
which will then serve as the basis for a settlement-only class certifica-
tion.  The problems with such a system should be obvious: although 
the warring attorneys purport to represent the interests of the plaintiff 
class, they have strong personal incentives to agree to a suboptimal 
class settlement so that they can collect a handsome fee as class coun-
sel.  For defendants, such a “reverse auction” among plaintiffs’ counsel 
is pure gravy, as it allows them to choose the lowest bidder.231 
Similar problems can infect public enforcement.  For example, 
where representative suits by state attorneys general are permitted to 
preclude subsequent private actions involving the same harms, de-
fendants may hope to inspire a bidding war between public and  
private enforcers, where the lowest bidder gets the settlement.  The 
gambit may not work, of course.  One would hope that state attorneys 
general are less likely than private counsel to sell their citizens’ inter-
ests on the cheap, both because government attorneys are charged 
with promoting the public interest and because their expected financial 
gain is significantly smaller and less direct than that of contingency-fee 
class counsel.  The point here is a relative one.  To the extent financial 
incentives prompt competition among would-be enforcers, that compe-
tition may produce less overall enforcement, not more. 
Financial incentives, in short, are a blunt tool.  They may provide a 
valuable spur to action for agencies (like the CPSC, perhaps) that cur-
rently are performing well below optimal levels of enforcement.  Here 
again, the comparison to private enforcement is apt.  Commentators 
have described private enforcement as “a form of auto-pilot enforce-
ment [that runs] via market incentives, [and] that will be difficult for 
future legislative majorities . . . to subvert.”232  The same is true of fi-
nancial incentives in public enforcement.  A revolving fund like the 
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one created by HIPAA, or the hypothetical CPSC fund discussed 
throughout this section, can rev up an idle agency and set it in motion.  
But such incentives provide an engine, not a rudder: they encourage 
movement without providing much direction.  The impetus still may 
be useful if action is what is needed — but it can be dangerous, and 
downright counterproductive, in circumstances where carefully cali-
brated enforcement is critical.233 
Indeed, the discussion here has not yet touched on what is perhaps 
the most problematic aspect of financial incentives: their tendency to 
push agencies toward financial rather than injunctive relief.  Financial 
penalties can produce meaningful deterrence in appropriate cases.  But 
in some circumstances the most effective remedies are nonmonetary.  
Precisely because private enforcement tends to be financially motivat-
ed, private parties cannot be expected to obtain those injunctive reme-
dies.  When it comes to forward-looking relief, public enforcers hold 
the clear advantage.  That advantage is lost, however, if public en-
forcement moves too close to the private model.234 
This problem is serious, but it is not invariable.  Injunctive relief is 
not a critical component of every enforcement scheme, and not all in-
junctive remedies are created equal.  Consider, again, the CPSC.  The 
agency has a two-pronged approach to ensuring that hazardous con-
sumer products are removed from stores and homes as quickly as pos-
sible.  The first prong is injunctive in nature: product recalls, which 
are almost always the product of negotiation and voluntary action by 
the responsible firm.235  The second prong of the agency’s strategy is 
monetary: civil penalties for companies that knowingly fail to report 
potentially hazardous products.236  If financial incentives caused the 
CPSC to focus on civil penalties to the detriment of product recalls, 
the policy consequences would be regrettable indeed.  Nevertheless, 
there is reason for optimism in this example.  Unlike other forms of in-
trusive, ongoing injunctive relief, a recall is a one-shot event.  More-
over, it will typically be in the defendant’s best interest to remove a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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hazardous product from the marketplace, since continuing sales will 
likely expand the firm’s liability exposure.  Finally, recalls — like dol-
lars — are easily quantified and measured.  The CPSC reports the 
number of recalls and related information each year,237 and — again 
like financial recoveries — those figures lend themselves to easy com-
parisons with prior years.238  The upshot is that the CPSC should have 
ample incentives to continue to concentrate on recalls, and both the 
agency’s overseers in Congress and public watchdog groups should 
have ample tools to monitor the agency’s performance.  These factors 
ameliorate the concern that a revolving fund or similar financial incen-
tive would provoke a shift away from recalls in favor of civil penalties. 
We can now return to the question with which we began this sec-
tion: can financial incentives provide an institutional counterweight to 
disincentives for public enforcement?  We have sought to show that 
the answer is yes.  But, as we suggested at the outset and have empha-
sized throughout this discussion, that “yes” comes with heavy qualifi-
cations.  Financial incentives cannot cure many of the problems that 
ail underperforming agencies, and in many cases they will cause more 
harm than good.  Indeed, one of our primary goals in this Article has 
been to sound a warning about the effects of revolving funds and simi-
lar institutional structures.  Such funds are commonplace at the state 
level, and have begun to crop up in federal law as well.  Yet there is no 
evidence that policymakers have considered the full costs and benefits 
of arrangements that allow public enforcers to fund themselves.  We 
have sketched those costs and benefits here, but — by design — our 
discussion has been general and theoretical rather than context-specific 
and empirical.  We hope that future work will fill in the picture of fi-
nancially motivated public enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
Financial incentives blur the line between public and private en-
forcement.  Agencies and their attorneys have reasons, unrelated to de-
terrence, to attempt to maximize the dollars collected through en-
forcement.  The profit-maximizing incentive is strongest when the 
institution in question is permitted to retain the proceeds of enforce-
ment.  But even when public enforcers must turn over their winnings 
to the general treasury, they may have reputational incentives to focus 
their efforts on measurable units like dollars earned. 
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 237 See, e.g., id. (“In 2011, CPSC staff completed 405 recalls (100 percent voluntary), involving 
millions of consumer product units that either violated mandatory standards or were defective 
and presented a substantial risk of injury to the public.”). 
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We have argued that financially motivated public enforcers will 
tend to behave more like private enforcers.  That behavior is not nec-
essarily a bad thing, but it highlights the need for more careful think-
ing about the circumstances under which financial incentives can add 
value to public enforcement, and when their costs exceed their bene-
fits.  Small pockets of experimentation can be seen, particularly at the 
state and local level.  For example, in the mid-1980s New York City 
experimented with a Speedy Disposition Program, which used finan-
cial incentives to encourage District Attorneys’ offices in the city’s five 
boroughs to reduce the number of older felony cases on their dockets 
and the number of long-term detainees in pretrial detention facili-
ties.239  Like the revolving funds described here, the Program offered 
cash incentives not to individual prosecutors, but to the prosecuting 
offices themselves.240  The results of the experiment were mixed, with 
notable improvements made in Manhattan, for example, but none in 
Brooklyn and Queens.241  Examples like this program illustrate the po-
tential for financial incentives to improve the functioning of public en-
forcement.  At the same time, however, they remind us how much we 
have to learn about how such incentives work in practice, particularly 
when they are directed at institutions rather than individuals. 
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